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ABSTRACT
Contracting for major weapon systems within the U.S. Government is
a professional and political challenge. From the initial concept
development to the acceptance of a complete working weapon system,
military acquisition professionals must balance pressure from the
Executive and Legislative branches of the Government with the user
requirements. This balance must be achieved using Government generated
policy and procedures as they apply to purchases from private sector
corporations. A historical study of the initial F-14 acquisition will
identify the distinctive problems in this type of procurement.
Success can be duplicated and failures can be avoided by matching
historical patterns of major weapon systems acquisition with current
contracting requirements. Comparing the steps in the F-14 acquisition to
the acquisition of any major weapon systems will provide key steps to
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Procurement of major military weapon systems draws much
attention to itself due to the enormous amount of public tax
dollars invested. Congress, news media, and public oversight
are tightly focused on DOD procurements to discern the bad
business decisions made in the Government's procurement
business. This has created intense pressure on Government
procurement executives to adapt to constant changes in
procurement procedures initiated by legislative action to cure
old procurement problems and endeavor to prevent future
managment problems.
To understand how the DOD purchases weapons, it will be
helpful to understand the simple differences between purchases
in the private and military sectors. In the private sector,
the purchase of an aircraft would not take place until all
costs for the aircraft have been expended to completely
develop and fly the aircraft that will perform the commercial
application for which it was designed. In military
procurement, the Government and private contractor agree on a
cost before the aircraft exists, then the contractor
constructs the aircraft.
The Government conducts its unique procurement business by
mandating acquisition directives it hopes can flexibly respond
to changes while preventing problems that have already
occurred. The current system of regulations is governed by
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) , and the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) , as they
specifically apply to the Department of Defense 5000.1, .2,
. 2M directives for major weapon systems acquisitions. The
resultant changes in the current regulations were made
necessary by many 1970 's procurements, one of these being the
F-14. By researching the dynamic changes caused by programs
like the F-14 and comparing them to the standing regulations,
the researcher will be able to analyze critically the current
system's response to future contracts.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research is to perform a
comprehensive historical study of the early years of the F-14
procurement, from 1962 to 1974. Emphasis will be on the
researcher's interpretation of historical events compared and
contrasted with current legislative requirements to discern
what current requirements exist to correct previous and
prevent future procurement errors. Errors made in many weapon
systems procurements have common problems which can be
analyzed, corrected, and applied across the board to all types
of major weapon purchases. This case study will attempt to
provide lessons learned on problems that can be practically
applied to future weapon systems procurements.
C. SCOPE
This thesis is a case study of the F-14 aircraft contract.
The study focuses on three phases of the contract cycle
beginning with the requirements determination phase and ending
with the aircraft's introduction into the fleet, including




1. The primary research question is:
What were the principal successes and failures
experienced during pre-solicitation, award, and post award
phases of the F-14 contract and can they be duplicated or
avoided in future major weapon systems acquisitions?
Subsidiary research questions include:




What is a Mission Needs Statement and how can it lead
to an effective contract?
4. What was the overall Acquisition Plan (including
milestones) for this contract and to what extent did execution
of the contract meet the plan?
5. What major organizations outside the Navy affected the
decision to have Grumman manufacture the F-14, and how did
they collaborate?
6. How should a source evaluation and selection take place
compared to the F-14 evaluation and selection?
7. How were competitive decisions made during the F-14
contract?
8. What decisions adversely affected the contract
administration phase of the F-14 production?
9. What ownership decisions were affected by earlier
contract decisions and in what ways were they affected?
10. What are some lessons learned and aspects for major
weapon systems acquisition?
E . METHODOLOGY
Preliminary research included an in-depth analysis of the
contract case history. This included historical documentation
detailing the Request For Proposal (RFP) , the Mission Needs
Statement (MNS) , the contract, along with historical
periodical references. In addition, existing Government
regulations, orders, instructions, and policy guidance
letters, were analyzed.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
There are six chapters in this thesis. The chapters will
lead the reader through the sequence of events that took place
in the initial F-14 procurement. Historical facts are
presented and developed, along with the current system of
procurement, emphasizing changes and corrections that have
occurred in current procurement requirements.
Chapter I is the thesis introduction.
Chapter II will present a brief background on the
requirements that precipitated the development of a major
weapon systems contract for a new Navy aircraft. The Navy's
requirement for a new aircraft will be followed as they
developed into a Mission Needs Statement.
Chapter III will introduce the political pressure present
in major weapon systems acquisitions. Conflict that arose
from user needs versus political goals will be explored as
they pertained to the F-14 aircraft.
Chapter IV will follow the F-14 through the major weapon
systems contract cycle. Contracting legislated requirements
and results will be studied.
Chapter V will identify problems in the F-14 contract that
were corrected by current legal requirements, policies, and
directives. Problem areas that have yet to be addressed by
current legislation will also be identified.
Chapter VI is the researcher's conclusions and
recommendations for future weapon systems acquisitions, and
further thesis research.
Appendix 1 will be a case study for use in the Acquisition
and Contracting Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Appendix 2 will be questions that a case study facilitator
can use in the classroom to lead a successful class
interactive examination of the case study in appendix one.
II. BACKGROUND ON MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS CONTRACTING
A. HISTORICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A NEW FIGHTER
The F-14 aircraft made its debut in December of 1972, but
its concept had been under development since 1950. After
World War II, enemy weapon technology continued to advance,
making aircraft carriers vulnerable to aircraft, cruise
missiles launched form aircraft or submarines, and low flying
land launched cruise missiles. The Navy had studied the
Russian threat toward fleet air defense and developed a broad
based reguirement for a subsonic aircraft that could fire
multiple missile shots at long range targets in order to
defend carriers. The originally imagined aircraft was
canceled by 1960 because it would only satisfy one mission.
(Bright, 1992, pp. 2-9)
The original aircraft's concept as a standoff weapon was
never dropped. It evolved into a multi-dimensional fighter
aircraft that could defend the carrier and fulfill the dual
role of offensively engaging enemy aircraft. Dual use
aircraft was a change required to use the minimum amount of
space on a carrier for defense while not detracting from the
devastating offensive striking power that an aircraft carrier
is designed to accomplish. The process of evolution begins
with a broadly defined user need. The design of a new
aircraft is always an evolutionary battle to find the
strongest aircraft that can survive in the current and
expected threat atmosphere that a user faces in combat.
In the multi-dimensional Soviet threat environment, where
an aircraft carrier can be attacked by missiles from other
aircraft, ships and submarines, a single mission aircraft
would not use the limited amount of space available on an
aircraft carrier effectively. (Moorer, 1969, pp. 3-4) An
aircraft carrier is large, but its valuable resource of space
must be handled effectively. Aircraft require much more than
landing and parking space. Repairs must be conducted while at
sea. This requires storage for aircraft parking, living and
eating space for the repair personnel and storage space for
spare parts. One aircraft must satisfy more than one mission
to use the space on an aircraft carrier in an effective
manner. Soviet air warfare philosophy had always employed
light, highly maneuverable aircraft that carry guns for close-
in air battles, normally called dogfighting. If a large
number of highly maneuverable Soviet aircraft attacks a
carrier, there is a good chance a few could escape the Navy's
"initially conceptualized stand off concept aircraft" with
deadly results for the aircraft carrier. (Stevenson, pp. 6-
12)
By developing a multi-mission aircraft with stand off and
close-in fighting capabilities, the Navy could make maximum
use of the resources available to defeat the threat presented
by Soviet aircraft.
The Navy, in the case of the F-14, and the military in
general, will never be the single deciding voter in what type
of weapon system is reguired for the United States. In our
version of Democracy, decisions on spending Government funds
rests with three power brokers, the Executive branch, the
Legislative branch, and the Judicial branch of Government.
(Bryson, 1988) The major player in the weapons decisions rests
with the Executive and Legislative power brokers of which the
Navy is only one Service member which gives input to the
executive decision making apparatus of the President, his
cabinet and appointed executives. If the Navy is going to be
able to prove that it has a practical need for an aircraft, it
has to get the Executive branch to support the need for that
aircraft. Without the Executive branch backing up a Navy
request, Congress would not have any reason to apportion and
fund a procurement request. (Alexander, 1965, pp. 52-65)
The Navy was not alone in its fight for finances to field
a new aircraft. Every branch of the Armed Services was also
competing for Executive branch support and Congressional
funding. During the time frame of the F-14 acquisition, the
Air Force had successfully fielded their concept of a new
fighter aircraft to meet their envisioned Soviet threat. The
Navy and Air Force aircraft concepts would be reguired to meet
in "a head to head" struggle for developmental funding
support. Both Services' concept requests for aircraft had to
be reviewed by the Secretary of Defense, and then the
President. President John F. Kennedy erected a major road
block to both Services, and their desires for a new aircraft
by appointing Robert McNamara as his Secretary of Defense in
January of 1961. (Alexander, 1965, pp. 245-249)
The processes by which the Navy and the Air Force
indicated their aircraft performance requirements to overcome
the Soviet threat had to be indicated clearly to the Executive
branch of the Government. The Executive branch support was
required to influence Congressional funding for a new weapon
system that meets the need defined by the future users of a
new aircraft. The document used to explain the Navy and Air
Force needs is called a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) . A MNS
should be able to clearly show the Executive branch why there
are differences between two Services' requirements, and the
need for a unique weapon system for each Service.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OP THE MISSION NEEDS STATEMENT (MNS) AND
HOW IT WAS DEVELOPED.
A major defense acquisition program is defined as a
"...funded effort that is designed to provide a new or
improved material capability in response to a validated need."
(Department of Defense 5000.1, 1991, pp.2). In order for a
weapon system user to obtain the quality and type of weapon
that is desired, all the weapon system's requirements must be
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insisted upon as deliverable items in the contract. An
effective contract can only be written with the detailed
guidance in a MNS
. The MNS is the first step that defines the
weapon system requirements. This mandates a carefully
prepared MNS because it will become the foundation from which
a contractual document is constructed.
All major weapon systems are based on identifiable mission
needs. These needs are generated by assessing current and
future enemy threats. In the case of the F-111B, political
desires to save money forced the use of a standard aircraft
for the Navy and the Air Force. (Acquisition Strategy Guide,
1984, pp. 1.1-1)
A MNS evolves from a very broad user generated needs
statement into system specific requirements. It is important
that the proper amount of effort be expended in preparing a
well planned MNS. With planning and time, the operational
needs of the user will be translated into a stable and
affordable program. (Department of Defense Directive 5000.1,
1991, pp. 1-2 and Ch.3) Unfortunately, at the time of the
initial MNS for the F-14, the Navy's MNS was over-ruled.
In the initial MNS for the F-14, managerial desires by the
Executive branch over-rode user requirements, mandating a
common aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force. The common
aircraft (the F-111B) did not meet all the mission needs of
the Navy. Both the Navy and the Air Force had specific user
needs, requiring different aircraft to achieve their goals.
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The trade-off between cost savings in standardization (called
commonality by Secretary of Defense McNamara) and user
mandated performance requirements was not made carefully
enough, resulting in the manufacture of an aircraft that'would
never meet the flying requirements of the Navy. The
justification of cost savings was politically motivated, not
user generated. This does not mean that cost should not be
considered in a major weapon system procurement. It does
mandate a careful exploration of cost versus performance
trade-offs so that a user defined need can be satisfied by the
weapon system that is built. If there is not enough time, if
there are any ambiguities or needs that are not specific
enough, higher authority can take this into account when
assessing cost versus performance trade-offs. A poorly
written MNS is open to many misinterpretations that can result
in higher authority being given the leeway it needs to make
politically expedient decisions that do not enhance the
probability of attaining the mission need a user requires in
a weapon system. The F-14 MNS was complete but the Navy's
mission needs were subordinated to the needs of the Secretary
of Defense.
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III. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS
COMMAND FULFILLING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE F-14 CONTRACT
This chapter introduces two of the major players in the
approval process of a MNS. The reader needs to understand the
policies and politics during the period of the F-14 contract
to fully appreciate why the Navy's F-14 aircraft MNS met
initial failure due to conflicting political motives and
requirements
.
A. ROLES PLAYED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE PROGRAM
MANAGER
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is appointed by the
President of the United States to manage military resources.
He has the power to formulate budget estimates and implement
programs of a nature and kind that support and uphold the
President's military and domestic policies. The SECDEF is
influenced not only by Presidential policy, but also by the
political needs of United States citizens through the legal
and appropriation decisions imposed on the DOD weapons
decisions made by the Congress of the United States. He is
also responsible for interpreting and implementing
Presidential policy and Congressional programs for each
element of the Defense (DOD) . (Acquisition Strategy Guide,
1984, pp. 1.3.1-1 through 1.3.1.-3) The criteria that guide
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his managment choices are chiefly governed by political
directives to implement Presidential policy. The SECDEF
should also be concerned with each military department while
he makes decisions based upon the needs of the President and
the restrictions imposed on him by Congress.
The Program Manager (PM) is appointed by the military
system commander to manage a weapon system procurement
program. The PM acts as the Service branch agent responsible
for planning, developing, and acquiring the weapon system that
meets a user's MNS . In the F-14 contract the PM acts as
NAVAIRSYSCOM's direct representative in a program. The PM
must transform the mission needs statement from a concept into
an operational piece of equipment. [Acquisition Strategy
Guide, 1984, pp. 1.2-1 through 1.2-5] The PM must also





In the broadest sense, the PM must manage a program within
budget and schedule to ensure a weapon system will perform as
intended and is logistically supportable when it enters the
operational user's hands. If the logistic support of spare
parts, repair machinery, technical manuals and trained repair
personnel are not provided for by the PM, costly contract
changes will be required.
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The two primary managerial decision makers in weapon
systems procurement can have an adversarial relationship when
it comes to developing, producing and fielding a new weapon
system. The PM makes every effort to field a system that
meets the user defined needs in the MNS. The SECDEF, who has
full knowledge of the users MNS, must balance the scales
between cost, performance, and Presidential policy. There is
nothing wrong with this system; it is a natural outgrowth of
the democratic checks and balances derived from the United
States Constitution. The adversarial relationship will not
occur as long as the SECDEF carefully considers three factors.
He must consider the PM's input, select the most cost and
performance worthy system and successfully meet political
requirements. Breakdowns leading to adversarial problems
occur when a consensus is not achievable with the information
that is at hand.
If the PM does not have a clearly defined MNS from the
user, the SECDEF does not have the firepower to support the
development of a weapon system. In this case, the
overwhelming Presidential and Congressional consensus to
obtain the best cost can lead to a decision that does not
favor the desires of the military user.
The other decision criterion that can break down a cost
and performance effective decision comes about when the SECDEF
does not listen to the user or the Congress. In this case the
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SECDEF follows the Presidential policy with little
consideration of the Congress, the PM, or the user's needs.
With the general roles and motivations of the SECDEF and
PM explored, the reader can move on to the specific events
that occurred resulting in the fielding of the F-14.
B. THE TFX PROJECT, ITS EVOLUTION INTO THE F-lll
The United States Air Force (USAF) had developed its own
MNS for a new aircraft at the same time as the Navy. In 1959
the USAF needed a new aircraft that could land in half the
distance that its current fighters required. The USAF
envisioned their aircraft having a multi-mission as an attack
bomber that could fly to Europe or Asia non-stop with only one
refueling. The aircraft would be able to fly at treetop
level, at mach speed and deliver its nuclear weapons payload
before escaping the enemy target area. This MNS went through
an evolution from fixed wing to a variable swept wing aircraft
that could accommodate the USAF's MNS. The wings could move
from their extended position for take-offs to a deeply swept
position for supersonic speed. Although a swept wing design
added considerable weight to the aircraft, the Air Force saw
the trade-off as negligible in comparison to the user
requirements for the aircraft. (Stevenson, pp. 12-14)
The Navy's multi-mission requirements called for an attack
aircraft that was heavy enough to carry stand-off missiles and
maneuverable enough to engage enemy aircraft in dog fights
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when necessary. The aircraft would require a long on-station
fuel capacity at distances from the aircraft carrier of 200
miles or more. The aircraft had to be light enough to take
off and land on a short aircraft carrier flight deck yet
strong enough to withstand the violent catapult shot and
arresting gear tailhook landings required on an aircraft
carrier. (Configurations of the F-111A, & B Unveiled, 1964,
pp. 21-22)
The Navy and the Air Force were competing to develop their
MNS into a weapon system. Both Services are elements of DOD,
and fall under the supervision of the SECDEF. SECDEF McNamara
compared the Navy and Air Force aircraft MNSs. On the
surface, the MNS of both Services seemed similar to McNamara.
Both Services were seeking a fuel efficient aircraft that
could remain aloft for long periods of time while carrying
significant amounts of fuel and weapons. Both Service forces
needed the variable swept wing system for short take offs,
landings, and maneuverability in dog fights at supersonic
speeds. These similarities were key to the McNamara decision
on how to meet both Services' mission needs.
SECDEF McNamara entered his office with a Presidential
mandate to reduce inter-service rivalry and weapon systems
expenditures. There would be a great tax dollar saving if the
SECDEF could curtail inter-Service rivalries which caused
expensive procurements of separate weapon systems to satisfy
the similar needs of two or more branches of the Armed
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Services. (Alexander, 1965, pp. 89-90) The Navy and Air
Force aircraft question presented McNamara with the perfect
vehicle to satisfy Presidential mandate, reduce expenditures
and force an end to inter-Service rivalry. McNamara decided
to implement the President's agenda by requiring the Navy to
use the Air Force aircraft and demonstrate the virtues of
commonality of weapons in the Armed Services. McNamara 's
decision was that the advanced fighter version of the Navy and
the Air Force would be satisfied by one aircraft, the F-lll.
(Kaufman, 1964, pp. 245-249)
Unfortunately for both Services, their mission needs were
not really similar. The Navy required a high altitude missile
and aircraft interceptor that could dog fight; the Air Force
sought a bomber that could fly at supersonic speed low under
enemy radar, deliver its payload and return home above enemy
defenses.
SECDEF McNamara would champion his commonality cause and
all the cost savings available by using one aircraft for two
Services. By seeing only the similarities and not the
differences in the Service's MNSs, this choice would receive
the backing of the President and Congress because a common
aircraft would supposedly cost less.
The common aircraft, the F-lll, called for an attack
computer and missile system that both Services agreed would
satisfy their needs. There was no argument that a contractor
could produce aircraft at a lower cost if he was building the
18
number of aircraft a dual Service procurement would present.
Logistics costs could also be lowered through commonality.
One school could be offered to both Services' technical
personnel to teach them the repair and maintenance of the
F-lll. Spare parts could be purchased in such large numbers
that their cost would be significantly lower by a dual Service
procurement. McNamara considered the incompatible MNS to be
outweighed by the tremendous cost savings offered in
commonality.
If the Navy and Air Force had combined their forces to
overcome the performance losses that would come from common
aircraft, they may have had enough power to make McNamara
reconsider his F-lll decision. Unfortunately, Secretary
McNamara used the ancient political move of dividing and
conquering opposition to the F-lll by giving the Air Force the
responsibility of managing and developing the aircraft.
McNamara went so far as to decree that the Air Force MNS would
be compromised as little as possible to meet the Navy's need.
(McNamara, 1961, pp. 1] The later decision prompted Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy's Director of Systems Analysis to say:
The Air Force really didn't care about making the F-lll
carrier capable. You could compromise the Air Force
mission, somewhat, to make it carrier capable. You could
not compromise the Navy mission, somewhat, and make it
carrier capable. (The Buying Of The F-14, 1986, p. 2)
Secretary McNamara made another decision that somewhat
placated the bad feelings the Navy had at being forced to
accept an aircraft that was too heavy for carriers and failed
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to meet all the Navy's needs. McNamara awarded the prime
contract for the F-lll to General Dynamics while giving
Grumman corporation the contract for the Navy version of the
F-lll called the F-111B. McNamara knew that Navy pilots-would
be well supported by their long time business partners at
Grumman. Grumman had built several successful generations of
aircraft for the Navy. Grumman had a large number of retired
Navy officers as its executives. They therefore had a great
deal of sensitivity to the requirements of Navy pilots.
(Coulam, 1972, pp. 244-245)
The political mandate to save money and control weapons
expenditures overrode the users MNS . The result of this
decision was an aircraft that did not meet all of the
requirements of either Service. The trade-offs between cost
savings through commonality, and user performance requirements
were decided in favor of cost savings.
The Navy's F-111B began flying in May of 1965. It
immediately had problems. Its engine inlets were causing
stalls during flight and its excessive weight could not meet
Navy requirements for carrier landings. Reports by test
pilots of dangerous carrier approaches due to the windshield
angle and numerous other problems kept coming from the
aircraft that was supposed to meet the common needs of the
Navy and Air Force. (The Buying Of The F-14, 1986, pp. 4-5)
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C. THE NAVY DEVELOPS A NEW MNS, REFUTING THE NEED FOR THE
F-111B
The jurisdiction for risk management rests primarily with
two separate acquisition managers. The program manager is one
in the role as Government representative, and the private
contractor who develops the weapon system bears the other part
of the responsibility for risk control. A "team" relationship
is essential to the development of a new weapon. In an effort
to reduce risk and avoid a problematic weapon system
development program, the PM seeks the aid of the contractor
who is his partner in weapon system development. (Risk
Managmement, 1991, pp. 7-1 through 7-4)
The Navy openly sought cures for the F-lllB's problems.
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) awarded contracts
to McDonnell-Douglas and Grumman to evaluate the problems in
the F-111B. The contractors were to determine a way to
control the problems that were already discovered in the first
year of test flights. These contractors were aided in their
research by intelligence information gathered during a Soviet
air show. The Soviets unveiled aircraft that flew higher and
faster than the F-lll. These new Soviet aircraft were also
equipped for dogfighting, a mission need dropped by the Air
Force in favor of air-to-air missile defense. (Stevenson, pp.
14-15)
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Grumman 's investigations found no way to improve the
F-111B for the Navy. What they presented was an unsolicited
proposal for a completely new aircraft. The new aircraft
would keep the swept wing concept, missiles, fire control
system and engines currently installed in the F-lll and put
them in an airframe that was smaller and lighter by using
titanium. The Grumman recommendations became known as the
VFX. (Stevenson, pp. 14-15)
At the same time as the VFX concept was being designed by
Grumman, SECDEF McNamara came under fire for his F-lll
decision. The program costs were going up and the performance
characteristics of the aircraft were going down. Television
news coverage had labeled the F-lll program as a product of
stubborn and incompetent management on the part of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. The American Broadcasting
Company (ABC) news program had learned of Grumman 's
unsolicited proposal for a new aircraft and suggested it as a
cost effective alternative to the botched F-lll. Within
days of this news broadcast, Admiral Zumwalt formed "Fighter
Study Group II" to examine the technical and financial
possibilities of using the VFX design if the F-111B contract
was canceled.
The news media coverage alerted three other aircraft
manufacturers to the Navy's desires for a new aircraft. Each
of these companies submitted unsolicited proposals of their
own aircraft designs to the Navy. In the midst of the
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controversy, SECDEF McNamara announced his intentions to
leave the Department of Defense. Four days after McNamara
left office, the F-111B was canceled by the Senate Armed
Services Committee in March of 1968. (Coulam, 1972, pp. 244-
245)
At the start of this section the primary players in weapon
systems acquisition were reported to be the SECDEF and the PM.
The SECDEF was compelled by Presidential and Congressional
spending policies to pursue a cost effective common weapon
system at the expense the Navy's specific user mission needs.
The role of the press and the American public was not
mentioned. Americans can and do play an active part in the
survival of a new weapon. If the will of the people can be
polarized and focused on a subject, they can induce enough
pressure on their Congressional representatives to change
previous decisions. The galvanizing agent that turned
individual and Congressional support against the F-111B was
the power of the press. It is doubtful that a PM could muster
the influence that was required to cancel the F-111B as
quickly as the ABC news report did. Continuous failure of
performance was not enough to get the SECDEF and Congress to
stop funding the F-111B. It took a news report that produced
popular opposition toward the F-111B to force its
cancellation. The power of the press to change Congressional
opinion should never be underestimated by the PM.
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE F-14 CONTRACT
A. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
The PM is ultimately responsible for meeting program
objectives. To achieve success, a PM will hold his
developmental partner, the defense contractor, to the promises
he made in the contract. The contractor is a team member that
the PM relies upon to develop and produce a weapon system that
meets the PM's requirements. As a rule, the PM must not take
all contractor requirements as mandates. The PM should use
the large Government infrastructure of technical, contracting,
engineering and production personnel to assist him in
certifying or changing contractor requirements to get the best
weapon system. This attention to detail will obtain a
reasonable price for both the Government and the contractor.
(Major Weapon System Contracting, 1991, pp. 1-2)
Success in a weapon system acquisition will be achieved if
the PM can develop an acquisition strategy at the earliest
point possible to achieve his MNS and all user requirements.
A successful acquisition strategy comprises the objectives and
goals to achieve technical, performance and resource risk
managment addressed in the MNS. The strategy will also serve
as a road map to assist in trade-off decisions necessary to
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balance system cost with performance requirements.
(Acquisition Strateqy Guide, 1984, pp. 1.5-1 through 1.5-8)
The acquisition plan goes much further then defining only
the weapon systems requirements. Requirements for contract
type and contractor incentives are addressed in the
acquisition plan. Also, communications with contractors can
be addressed to ensure all competitors receive the same
information so as not to assist any one contractor more than
the other contractors. The evaluation criteria for
competitors are also laid out to assist in decision making and
lay the course required to successfully procure a new weapon
system.
The PM draws assistance in the manaqement task from many
sources. The Contractinq Officer (CO) will assist the PM in
interpretinq his requirements into contract terminoloqy. The
CO can prevent ambiquity. This will in turn assist the
contractor in his performance of the exact task required to
achieve all the PM's requirements and successfully complete
the contract.
Up to this point, the Navy aircraft systems command had
relied on the support of the F-111B PM to represent the Navy's
view point. Anticipating the cancellation of the F-111B
program, NAVAIRSYSCOM established a program office for a
follow-on aircraft to the F-111B. This step was necessary to
reduce NAVAIR's acute sense of urgency over the fact that they
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had wasted six years in the F-111B procurement program.
(Moorer, 1969, pp. 15-16)
The MNS was well-developed. The F-111B had helped in the
requirements determination for a new fighter. The F-111B
information, combined with the Grumman unsolicited proposal,
was essential to the remarkably fast time in which the Navy's
Request For Proposal (RFP) was written. By the time the
Senate Appropriations Committee approved funds for the new
aircraft, the Navy's program office had its RFP ready to
submit for contractor competition. The normal four month
approval period for an RFP had been reduced to only 10 days.
(Moorer, 1969, pp. 15)
The requirements in the RFP were very similar to Grumman 's
original proposal. The requirements included:
1. Two Pratt & Whitney TF-30 engines, essentially the
same as in the F-lll.
2. The AWG-9 weapon system with Phoenix missiles that is
basically the same as in the F-lll.
3. A two-man crew, seated front and rear, narrowing the
fuselage and lessening drag.
4. Have the capacity to carry six Phoenix missiles or
combinations of several other missiles and one internal
M-61A 2 0mm cannon. The cannon gave the aircraft the
dogfight ing capability the Navy wanted.
5. Carrier take-off and landing requirements.
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(U.S. Congress, Part 3, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, pp.
354-355)
B. THE SOLICITATION PROCESS
The solicitation phase begins when the approved RFP is
released for defense contractors to view. Competition is
desired because it is the best way to keep defense contractors
from maximizing profits at the Government's expense. The
Government will solicit as many qualified firms as possible.
The RFP is funded initially to solicit contractors and
advertise weapon systems requirements. Initial RFPs can also
clarify the weapon system requirements. While the RFP's needs
and concepts are being clarified and explored, the possibility
exists for lowering the aircraft cost and obtaining a better
weapon system for the Government through competition.
During the solicitation phase, bidders 7 conferences can be
held to further clarify contract requirements. This bidder
conference communication process should be fair to all
contractors and not lend assistance to any one contractor.
Five contractors responded to the RFP released to
contractors on June 21, 1968. Five one million dollar
definition contracts went out to Ling Temco Vought, Grumman,
McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics, and North American
Rockwell with a required proposal submission date of
October 1, 1968. (Stevenson, pp. 15)
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Four of the five contractors proposed a swept wing design.
The low cost proposal design was so long it raised concern
about parking space on board a carrier. All the contractors
were allowed a wide variety of communication with the program
office with the ability to withdraw a proposal and work on it
some more if desired. Each contractor's design looked
increasingly similar to each other as a result of their
program office communications. If the RFP had continued any
longer, it may have been hard to tell the difference between
each of the contractors offers. (The Buying Of The F-14,
1986, pp. 6)
C. EVALUATION AND SELECTION
The program manger evaluates the inputs from contract
managers in response to his RFP. His procurement and source
selection plans are now used to select qualified contractors.
To prevent showing favoritism, the source evaluation
criteria should be flexible enough so as not to exclude any
one contractor's ideas. The most often used critera evaluate:
• Whether the contractors' proposals effectively meet the
MNS.
• Cost of development should be compared, along with Life
Cycle Costs (LCC)
.
• Manning and training requirements.
• Spare part support and what level of reliability is
expected.
• Maintainability and supportability in the fleet.
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• Safety requirements.
• Contractor's past performance.
• Contractor's facilities are evaluated. Are they adequate
or can they become adequate?
• Contractor's technical capabilities and production
requirements
.
• Contractor's manaqement skills and expertise.
These criteria should lead to the selection of a
contractor who can qive the Government its best value for the
money. The list of selection criteria is not all inclusive.
Other criteria specific to a certain weapon system contract
can be added to adequately define how to choose the best
contractor. Cost should never be the only criterion
considered in the acquisition of a major weapon system.
Quality of system and best value do not always come at the
lowest price. Best value encompasses technical superiority
and should lower the risk of producinq a weapon. The PM
should use as many selection criteria as necessary to obtain
a weapon that will meet the Navy's needs. (Federal
Acquisition Requlation, 1990, pp. 15.603-605)
Competition should continue to be emphasized after the
initial RFP. There is no requirement to narrow the field of
respondinq contractors to one durinq the first selection
process. Restrictinq the competitive field to the best two or
three contractors should take place. The initially funded
contractors should be limited to those with the best proposals
that can meet the Government's requirements. The final
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competitors will be funded for further contract exploration
and final selection of a winning contractor.
The initial field of five contractors for the F-14
contract was narrowed down to two competitors by January 5 of
1969. The two finalists were Grumman Aerospace, and
McDonnell -Douglas.
The Grumman version initially cost much more than the
McDonnell-Douglas aircraft. Grumman originally submitted a
quotation of $2,781,950,100. Their modified submission
included two kinds of changes for a price reduction of
$3 2 6,3 00,000. For the first change, Grumman lowered the
ceiling price of the aircraft by $362.3 million. The second
change involved reallocating $112.1 million of general and
administrative costs on equipment and parts that were
furnished by the Government. This change redistributed some
of its overhead costs to other corporate activities. Grumman
indicated that this accounting change was recommended by the
Department of Defense. (The Buying Of The F-14, 1986. pp. 6)
After a little more cost shaving was done, the new Grumman
proposal stood at $2,419,950,100 compared to McDonnell-
Douglas's proposed cost of $2,319,422,000, a difference of
$100,528,100. The difference is quite large but when compared
in scope to the total contract price and other evaluation
criteria, it was small enough to give Grumman the contract.
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The Defense Department announced that Grumman had won the
contract on January 14, 1969. There was no opposition at any
stage in the Navy's internal review process. The Navy's
Source Selection Advisory Council had reached a unanimous
decision based on Grumman' s past performance, their
substantial technical and operational superiority, their
lesser development risk, and greater potential. (Stevenson,
pp. 15) The Grumman basic fighter design was superior to the
McDonnell-Douglas aircraft in terms of speed, climb and
maneuverability. The advisory council believed the risk
associated with the new McDonnell-Douglas aircraft could
require major re-design and increase cost while prolonging the
delivery schedule. Cost was not the major decision making
factor. McDonnell-Douglas' ceiling prices were five percent
lower than Grumman 's and target costs were almost identical.
When the Navy compared its independent cost estimate for the
F-14 to the contract price, it appeared that the Navy saved
$472,950,000 with its competition plan. (U.S. Congress, Part
3, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969 pp. 355-357)
D. THE CONTRACT
The contract is the legal basis on which the Government
and contractor relationship and responsibilities are
delineated. It should define all the contractor's
responsibilities in terms of what is necessary for delivery
and completion of each contractually agreed upon feature.
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Industry is relied on for development and production of a
weapon system. The contract will provide for control and
direction of the contractor's efforts in weapon development.
The terms of the contract will provide all monitoring efforts
that a contractor has agreed to so that the PM will have all
the information necessary to make sound weapon systems trade-
off decisions to obtain the system required by the user in as
economical and effective manner possible.
PMs cannot surrender any of their surveillance
requirements to the defense contractor via the contract. All
surveillance performed by Civil Servants, must be performed by
them and no one else. To prevent this, the PM has technically
competent engineering, production and contracting personnel to
assist in the decision making process.
The contract will specify the contract type to achieve the
plans made in the acquisition plan. There are two broad
contract types. They are fixed-price and cost-reimbursement
contracts. Each type of contract has its own desired
applications to fairly reimburse a contractor for the level of
risk he has undertaken in the contract.
A fixed-price contract is normally used to place the
maximum financial risk upon the contractor. The contractor
assumes full responsibility in the form of profits and losses
for all costs under or over the contractually agreed to price
for delivery of the weapon system to the Government. This in
turn gives the contractor maximum incentive to control
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contract costs and protect his profit. (Acquisition strategy
Guide, 1984, pp. 3.6-1 through 3.6-2)
Cost-reimbursement contracts were used from World War II
up through the early 1960 's. The contractor was paid for all
costs incurred while developing the program for production.
The contractor is expected to give the best effort to stay
within the bid cost but is not incentivised by any contractual
agreement to do so. The contractor is better off when
inefficient because he will be paid all costs he incurs.
(Acquisition Strategy Guide, 1984, pp. 3.6-1 through 3.6-2)
In the case of the F-14 contract, a refinement on the
fixed-price contact was chosen because the contractor and the
Government felt there was a lower risk in developing the F-14.
The-Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) contract was used. It
is a fixed-price contact with a provision to adjust the profit
and establish a final contract price by a formula based upon
the relationship between the final negotiated total cost of
the contract and the total target cost established in the
original contract. The following elements are negotiated in
the original FPIF contract:
• Target cost of the contract.
• Target profit the contractor expects to generate upon
completion of the contract.
• Ceiling Price the Government will pay for the system being
developed.
• A share ratio to determine the final profit and price.
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After performance of the contract, the final contract
price is established in accordance with the formula. When the
final cost is more than the target cost the result is a final
profit less than the target profit or even a net loss to the
contractor. (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 1990, pp. 16.401
through 16.403.1 and DFARS Ref. 216.402). The contractor
assumes a considerable amount of risk and is incentivised to
control his costs to prevent losses of his own profits.
(Incentives In Contracts, 1989, pp. 1-26)
The following description of incentives and Multi-Year
Procurements in Government contracting may prove to be
remedial to Government contractors. The information is
inserted to give non-contracting personnel an insight into how
the Government tries to motivate private contractors by
controlling the requirements delineated in a Government
contract.
Incentives in contracts are used to adjust risk between
the Government and the contractor. Incentives used properly
will increase the amount of cooperation between the Government
and the contractor. Incentives motivate contractors to
increase their cost consciousness, technical certainty and
certain performance goals dictated in the contract's weapon
system performance requirements. (Acquisition Strategy Guide,
1984, pp. 3.7-1 through 3.7-6)
Incentives can have disadvantages. The administrative
cost to the Government can be increased because the Government
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must assess whether the incentives are achieving their desired
goals. Both the Government and the contractor have a
difficult time in establishing realistic cost targets.
Changes to the original contract inevitably result in cost
increases. If the contractor is not solely motivated by
profit, the Government is placed in a risky position of
accepting cost increases because they have fewer ways to
incentivise a company not motivated by profit.
Another element influencing the contract is the length of
the procurement. A Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) gives the
contractor funding stability. A defense contractor can commit
to buy expensive tools and materials in high guantities to
reduce costs. Labor can be managed and utilized efficiently
because a dependable cash flow is present. In many cases the
contractor commits to improve his plant and manufacturing
process because he knows he can rely on a certain amount of
business from the Government over a long period of time.
(Acquisition Strategy Guide, 1984, pp. 3.2-3 through 3.2-4)
There are disadvantages to MYP contracts. If the
Government cancels a contract, it will incur very high costs
from the contractor. Inflation and unstable markets can make
original price and cost elements become totally invalid over
time. This risk of inflation increases in direct proportion
to the length of the MYP.
Schedule risk can be controlled with a good contract.
Time is money, and schedules control the amount of money
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spent. A good contract will develop a schedule in consensus
with the contractor that allows full system development. Full
development occurs when all elements of the weapons
development program are scheduled with enough time to complete
each item. The interrelationships are tight in order to spend
the right amount on each element. Schedules can prevent or
make problems. If two or more elements of a schedule are
dependent upon each other, the change of schedule for one item
will affect the start date of another item. When more than
one interdependent item is scheduled at the same time, the
items are called concurrently scheduled items. (Risk
Management, 1991, pp 3-6 through 3-7) Concurrent scheduling
can reduce schedule risk but greatly increase performance risk
if a completion date slips. Slipping completion dates can
affect all the other dependent items awaiting the completion
of a dependent item. The schedule is largely a joint call
made by the contractor and the PM. Small errors in
scheduling can be overcome; large errors may require major
contract changes and cost the Government more money then
originally planned for.
If risk can be controlled by the contract, a program
should prove to be successful. Risk can occur in many
different areas of weapon production. For example, if a new
aircraft is surpassing the current state of the art, there is
a high degree of development risk for the contractor. In this
case the Government would have to pay the contractor for his
36
risk by utilizing a cost type contract. If there is not a
requirement to surpass the state of the art, the developmental
risk is lower. A different contract with incentives can be
used. Equitable risk sharing by way of a written contract is
essential to the success of a weapons program. (Risk
Managment, 1991, pp 3-6 through 3-12)
With the above introductory information, it will be easier
to see why the Government chose an FPIF contract structure for
the F-14 procurement. It will also lead to an understanding
of where the contactor did and did not properly assess the
level of risk involved in the contract. This erroneous risk
assessment reinforced political pressure against the F-14
procurement.
Contract negotiations between Grumman and the Navy went
quickly due to their long history of non-adversarial
relations. A Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) contract type
was chosen. This was a variant of the Total Package
Procurement (TPP) strategy developed by Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara. (The Buying Of The F-14, 1986, pp. 26) This
contracting strategy was designed to stop the cost overruns
that had plagued development projects of the 1950 's and 60 's
due to the use of cost type contracts. The older system,
called cost plus, allowed for the payment of direct costs for
overhead, plus an additional percentage as a fee or profit
which incentivised contractors to increase expenses to make
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more money. (U.S. Congress, Part 3, 93rd Congress, 1st
Session, 1973, pp. 409)
The TPP and FPIF strategy was designed to contain
expenditures by minimizing cost and technical risk. The
Government would pay a fixed-price in advance for a set number
of units over a set number of years. The contract was to run
for eight years. If the contractor's expenses fell below a
fixed-price, they would make increased profits. If Grumman
exceeded the fixed-price, they could not turn to the
Government for financial relief; they would have to absorb the
loss. In this way, it was envisioned by the Government that
Grumman would be encouraged to make a realistic bid based on
factual data concerning their overhead expenses and on careful
inflation predictions over the life of the contract. It also
allowed the Government some flexibility in rate procurement.
(U.S. Congress, Part 7, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, pp.
1115-1121)
TPP was advantageous for Grumman because it simplified
financial reporting requirements that the Government requires
of the contractor. TPP forced the contractor to make prudent
business decisions to avoid cost increases. The Government
had less of a requirement to oversee Grumman, presenting
Grumman with a hands-off attitude in TPP. (Coulam, 1972, pp.
379-384) This was possible because Grumman assumed all the
risk for cost control, allowing less Government scrutiny of
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corporate financial records. (U.S. Congress, 9lst Congress,
1st Session, Report No. 91-468, 1969. pp. 19-20)
The first year's production of Lot I aircraft was
designated for research and development. Grumman was to' begin
full production after Lot I. The number of aircraft to be
produced was undefined at the outset of the contract. In
1968, NAVAIRSYSCOM had forecast the purchase of 1,400
aircraft. By the time the contract was signed on February 3,
1969, the original forecast had been scaled down without
setting a firm number of purchases. A median number of
purchases were set for the first eight years. The Navy could
determine the actual quantity for each year's production one
year in advance, and notify Grumman of the decision through
the annual contract discussions. (The Buying Of The F-14,
1986, pp. 8)
To keep the F-14 from gaining weight during development,
a lesson learned from the F-lll, the contract included
incentives for maintaining the contracted agreement for
maximum aircraft weight. The contract specified a target
weight and rewarded Grumman to keep the new aircraft light.
Forty of the sixty points of selection critera available were
for incentive payments dependent on keeping the F-14 aircraft
weight as low as possible. The other twenty points were used
to enforce maintainability, cost control, approach speed, and
acceleration time to altitude. (Moorer, 1969, pp. 24-26)
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The Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) contract specified
a first year target price and ceiling price for the
aircraft. If Grumman hit the target price it could make a ten
percent profit on its expenses. For every additional expense
over the target price, the company would pay the additional
expense while the Government would pay a decreasing share of
the costs. The ceiling price, or maximum amount Grumman could
collect each year, was set at 125% of the target price for
every year after the first year. The ceiling price would
remain the same for eight years no matter what actual quantity
of aircraft was procured. (Stevenson, pp. 25)
The ceiling price Grumman could charge was designed to be
immovable throughout the duration of the contract. This
requirement was put into the contract due to tough
Congressional price control requirements aimed at military
contractors. Grumman 7 s ceiling prices were based on a
thorough statistical study of the cost of production already
experienced and documented by United States aircraft
manufacturers in the 1950 's and 60 's. Grumman studied Bureau
Of Labor Statistics figures for preceding years and based
their projected inflation rates on these figures. The rate
was set at two percent per year on materials and three percent
on labor. (U.S. Congress, Part 7, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session,
1972, pp. 300-309) No other special adjustments for inflation
were to be permitted until the negotiations for Lot VI in
fiscal year 1974.
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The contract did allow cost changes that arose from
evolution of the design of the F-14 during production.
Changes originated by the Navy (or from modifications to
Government Furnished Equipment {GFE} supplied by the Navy)
could be billed to the contract. Changes that Grumman
initiated on its own would require Grumman to absorb the
costs. The contract timelines were strict. The pressure to
make up for the lost years in the F-lll generated a
requirement to produce the F-14 in 24 months. To speed the
process further, Navy testing and evaluation of the F-14 was
not scheduled to begin until the aircraft was in production.
The concurrent scheduling would require any changes made as a
result of the test flights to be retrofitted onto existing
aircraft. (Harmon, 1989, pp. 49)
The procurement of the F-14 provided Grumman with other
compensation for activities and expenses beyond the cost of
manufacturing. Tooling costs would be paid over the second
and third year of the contract with target and ceiling prices
set in advance. Due to the significant capital investment
required for titanium fabrication, this amount of money was
significant to Grumman. The capability to subcontract
titanium work was not excluded from the contract. (The Buying
Of The F-14, 1986, pp. 8)
Overhead costs were computed by using records Grumman had
of its recent business base and its current total
manufacturing activity. The percentage of corporate overhead
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billed to the F-14 would be roughly proportional to the size
of that contract compared to Grumman 's total volume of
business. Quantities were unspecified for spare parts,
training and support materials. They would be negotiated year
by year as the Navy's needs became clearer. (The Buying Of
The F-14, 1986, pp. 9)
The prime contractor, Grumman, was responsible for design,
production and assembly of the aircraft. The Navy would
supply Pratt & Whitney engines, Hughes Aircraft avionics
systems and the Phoenix missile system as Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) sub-assemblies. (U.S. Congress, Part 5, 91st
Congress, 2nd Session, 1970 pp. 1120)
Pratt & Whitney had to adapt their TF-30 engine used in
the F-lll for use in the F-14. The TF-30 engine was full of
troubles so the Naval Air Systems Command required Pratt &
Whitney to develop a new version after the first sixty-six
aircraft were delivered. The Navy looked for two alternatives
to power the F-14 after the first sixty-six aircraft. One
option was to wait for a short time until a joint U.S. Air
Force/ Navy advanced technology engine was ready for service
in 1972. In addition, the Navy commissioned Pratt & Whitney
to develop a new higher-powered engine that would give the
F-14 the power its creators had anticipated. This engine was
to be ready by 1974. The decision not to wait for a proven
engine was made because the Navy believed it needed aircraft
now and any additional delay waiting for engines was deemed
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unacceptable. (U.S. Congress, Part 5, 91st Congress, 2nd
Session, 1970, pp. 1125-1131)
Grumman made subcontractor agreements for the parts and
subassemblies that were not provided as GFE. Between August
1968 and January 1969, Grumman had identified potential
subcontractors and used their price quotes as a basis to
prepare their final bid for the Government. In February of
1969 when Grumman signed the contract with the Navy, they had
not concluded any binding agreements on prices or quantities
with its subcontractors. (The Buying Of The F-14, 1986,
pp. 9)
Grumman had lowered its bid considerably from its original
cost estimates to win the F-14 contract. By September of
1969, only nine months after the F-14 award announcement,
Grumman started indicating to the Navy that their cost figures
may have been inaccurate. This news was precipitated by an
overall change in the aerospace market and was met with
Congressional concern. (U.S. Congress, Part 5, 92nd Congress,
1st Session 1970. pp. 438-444)
In the 1970 's, the aerospace industrial base was
declining. Defense spending had significantly reduced after
Viet Nam. Grumman produced the Navy's A-6E attack aircraft,
the E-2C early warning aircraft and the E-A6B electronic
warfare aircraft. Each one of these procurements were
reduced. The pride of Grumman, the NASA contract for the
Apollo lunar lander was the other big contract Grumman
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depended on to support its business base. After the United
States placed a man on the moon, the contract from NASA was
drastically reduced below forecasted levels. The down turn in
production levels happened at the same time that aircraft work
pay rates shot much higher than Grumman 's projections for the
F-14 program.
Inflation rates were projected to be two percent per year
for the first five years of the F-14 program. According to
Bureau of Labor Statistics, these forecasts were well below
actual figures. (U.S. Congress, Part 5, 91st Congress, 2nd
Session, 1970, pp. 1120)










1969 100 100 100
1970 102 103 105.9
1971 104 106 110.5
1972 106.1 109.2 114.1
1973 108.2 112.6 121.2
1974 110.4 115.9 134.5
Source: The Buying Of The F-14, 1986, pp. 18
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To further compound matters, the contract did not allow
for abnormal escalation controls to be implemented until 1973.
(U.S. Congress, Part 5, 92nd Congress 1st Session, 1971, pp.
438-440)
In September 1969, seven months after signing the F-14
contract, Grumman 's president told the Navy he was concerned
over contractual commitments as far as Lot IV and all
subsequent lots. In July of 1970, Grumman communicated fears
of financial difficulties after examining the severe economic
impact of the changing aerospace business base structure. The
Total Procurement Package (TPP) concept was becoming
unfeasible based on the cuts in the defense spending and
economic conditions. (U.S. Congress, Part 5, 92nd Congress,
1st Session, 1971, pp. 439-440)
The president of Grumman communicated these same fears to
NAVAIR in January of 1971. During this visit to Washington
D.C., he stressed that the price ceiling was so low that
Grumman was unable to deliver F-14s at the contractually
agreed to price. (U.S. Congress, Part 5, 92nd Congress, 1st
Session, 1971, pp. 440) A NAVAIR pricing team visited Grumman
to substantiate Grumman 's concerns. The team discovered that
Grumman had taken steps to reduce their overhead by reducing
their employment totals from 31,500 in 1969, to 25,300 in
1971. They also reduced their physical plant facilities by
630,000 square feet. (U.S. Congress, Part 5, 92nd Congress,
1st Session, 1971, pp. 442) Grumman was in trouble and
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capable of seeking relief under Public Law 85-804,
Extraordinary Contract Relief. This law allowed a contractor
who was being driven out of business by their Government
contract to receive Government help. The help would be in
terms of lengthening performance time in a contract, receiving
advance payments, amendments in Grumman 's favor without
consideration to the Government, and just about anything to
keep Grumman, a necessary Government contractor, financially
afloat. (Sherman, 1991, pp. 63) Grumman did not seek
Government relief. The reasons for not seeking relief at this
time are known only to the Grumman executives who made the
decision. In July of 1971, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
David Packard, requested that Grumman commit to the production
of fourty-eight aircraft for Lot IV, if Congress authorized
and appropriated the funding. Grumman committed to build the
aircraft at a loss on 27 July 1971.
The F-14 experienced developmental problems during its
test flight program. In December of 1970, just twenty-three
months after the contract was awarded, the F-14 prototype
crashed unexpectedly. This happened at a critical time period
when the Navy needed successful test results to bolster
Congressional support for the F-14. The crash highlighted the
Navy's bad decision to speed up the procurement of the F-14 by
deliberately overlapping testing and production. Before the
crash there was early Congressional Appropriations' Committee
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concern about the F-14 program. In December Congressional
feelings were:
It is the considered of the Committee that the Navy is
moving too fast into production of the F-14 aircraft. The
Committee does not share Navy optimism. . .that the F-14
aircraft represents a low risk program. (U.S. Congress,
Part 3, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1969, pp. 315)
Original schedules called for the production of sixty-six
aircraft before the Navy's final tests were completed. With
the crash, the aircraft produced before testing would cost
more due to an expensive retro-fit requirement on all
previously built aircraft to prevent further crashes. Back
fit programs like these are thought of by Congress as schemes
to "get well" as far as contract costs are concerned.
Congressional upheaval over the F-14 program arose quickly
fueled by early skepticism toward the Navy's low risk
assessment of the F-14 contract. Congressmen raised the
possibility that Grumman's final bid may have been
deliberately pegged below their real estimates on the
assumption that prices could be raised once the contract was
signed. Senators Mark Hatfield and William Proximire attacked
the program, going so far as to propose closing the F-14 line
and using modified F-4 Phantoms until another aircraft could
be developed. Their objections to the program were further
fueled by the problems the F-14 was having with its TF-30
engines. In order to shorten procurement lead time, TF-3
engines from the F-lll program were used in F-14 production.
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These engines were only to be installed in the first sixty-six
F-14s until Pratt & Whitney delivered a new engine in 1970
that would meet the original power and thrust requirements the
Navy had contracted for. Pratt & Whitney never did develop a
more powerful engine. This made the Navy increase the number
of aircraft to be equipped with the less satisfactory TF-30
engine. This further fueled the objections of Senators
Hatfield and Proxmire. Even the F-14's staunchest advocates
had to admit that this change seriously compromised the F-14's
performance. Fortunately for the F-14 program, funding was
not stopped. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard had learned
his lesson about concurrent development and testing and
initiated his "fly-before-you-buy" program, (Seamans, 1972,
pp. 62) preventing future programs from going into the
production phase before final testing of the prototype was
complete.
One major career casualty did result from the technical
scheduling and risk mistakes that took place. The program
manager, Captain Lionel Ames, was replaced by Captain Leonard
A. Snead. The F-14 program would continue in the face of
Congressional opposition.
On 5 December 1972, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) Program Budget Decision reduced the fiscal year
programmed procurement of F-14s from eighty-eight to fourty-
eight aircraft. This purchase under Lot V was received by
Grumman with a refusal to honor the existing contract without
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a price increase. Grumman said they had lost $85 million on
the program already and would lose $105 million more if they
did not get a contract price adjustment.
In similar contract disputes, the Pentagon had acceded to
contractor demands by rewriting the contract completely or
ordering system modifications that increased the contract
price. In the case of the F-14, the Navy was denied this kind
of choice. Congressional pressures had mandated only enough
money for the purchase of fourty-eight aircraft according to
original contract prices. (U.S. Congress, Part 3, 91st
Congress, 2nd Session, 1969, pp. 554) The Defense Department
was forced to announce it would hold Grumman to the originally
contracted price on December 11, 1972.
There was support that countered the opposition for the
F-14 in Congress. A Congressional bailout of Grumman was
being maneuvered in the House and the Senate by the New York
representatives. New York Senators Javits and Buckley
announced on the 13th of December 1972, that they would
propose legislation in 1973 to permit Grumman, of Bethpage,
New York, a higher price for F-14s. Similar action would be
forthcoming from the four New York Congressmen Grover, Leat,
Wydler and Roncallo. President Nixon was supportive of the
move to assist Grumman.
Following intensive negotiations between Grumman and the
Navy, Grumman agreed to produce the fourty-eight aircraft in
Lot V at the originally contracted price provided Congress
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authorized and appropriated necessary funding for a new
contract in fiscal year 1974. (U.S. Congress, Part, 3, 93rd
Congress, 1st Session, 1973, pp. 93)
The F-14's cost in constant 1969 dollars when the program
began was $9.7 million per aircraft. Changes in the contract
were authorized after Lot V, which led eventually to F-14
costs escalating to $17.9 million per unit by 1981. (The
Buying Of The F-14, 1986, pp. 14-16)
The new F-14 program manager, Captain Leonard Snead,
countered Congressional critics and started building support
for the program with an aggressive public relations program.
Every time the Congress would try another ploy to kill the
program, the program manager would make a ten minute film
showing off the aircraft's many attributes. Senator Proxmire
continued his assertions that the F-14 was nothing more than
a "Gold Plated" mistake that should be canceled. The battle
continued but the bottom line was the Navy began accepting
delivery of F-14s. The Navy had its new generation aircraft
for fleet protection.
The F-14 PM and his program office had learned some hard
but valuable lessons while procuring the F-14. The failure of
the F-111B presented the lesson that a common aircraft is only
feasible when Services fulfill common war taskings. If there
is no common task, a common weapon system should be avoided.
The PM office lost its first PM learning that concurrent
scheduling of test flights during production can have costly
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back fit results caused by rushing into production before
testing is complete. They also learned how important the
media is to the failure or success of a weapon system.
These lessons learned were limited to aircraft
procurements by the Navy. The Navy had learned some lessons
but every branch of the Armed Services had learned lessons
during this time frame. Some of the lessons were very
similar, others were Service unigue. None of these lessons
learned were combined on an inter-Service level to prevent
their occurrence in future programs until the late 1980 's.
This combining effort is the topic in the proceeding chapters
of this thesis.
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V. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS
The historical facts of the F-14 acquisition have been
presented. When comparing the historical acquisition of the
F-14 with the present day procurement policies, try to
comprehend how problems that occur in the procurement of the
of the F-14 have affected current procurement procedures. It
is not as easy to discern weaknesses in the new procurement
policy structure; these will be pointed out individually.
A. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS CONTRACTING
The DOD 5000.1, .2, and . 2M series of directives were
written in 1991 to establish "a disciplined management
approach for acquiring systems and material that satisfy the
operational user's needs." The system was set up for uniform
application to all DOD elements. Stability and af fordability
of a weapon system program are also addressed with the goal of
satisfying the user's needs.
The system is designed to make broad based long range
investments based on future fiscal resources. To facilitate
these future investment decisions, the management structure of
the DOD was streamlined, defined and shortened to assign
responsibility for tracking of procurements.
Initially a broad mission need is checked to see if it can
be satisfied without a new item being procured. If a simple
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doctrine or training change can satisfy the mission, there is
no need to procure a new item. The Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition (USD(A)) and his decision support
infrastructure will consider all materials that already exist
in the following hierarchy to see if they can satisfy the
mission need before a new start weapon program is authorized:
• (1) Use or modification of existing military system.
• (2) Use or modification of a commercial or allied system.
• (3) Can cooperative research with other Allied Nations
produce a new system.
• (4) Is there already a joint DOD Service program being
developed that will satisfy the user's needs.
• (5) When all above have been considered, a new start
Service-unique development program will be looked into.
(DOD Instruction 5000.2, 1991, pp. 3-11)
Once a new start has been approved, the broad requirements of
the user will evolve into a system specific description that
will satisfy a unique set of requirements and satisfy the
user's needs. (DOD Instruction 5000.2, 1991, pp. 1-5)
Risk managment is addressed through all phases of a
contract by the Government Program Manager (PM) and the
contractor. Factors such as design to cost, life cycle costs,
schedule, maintenance support, and concurrent engineering are
all used to lower risk, cost, and increase operability,
maintainability, produciability and reliability in weapon
systems procurement. (Risk Managment, 1991, pp. 2-1 through
4-13)
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Competition is mandated to be used to the maximum extent
possible. Competition will assist in feasibility studies of
alternate weapon systems to meet user needs.
Testing of weapon systems requires the establishment of a
testing activity that cannot be influenced by weapon systems
PMs. This averts the possibility of falsification of test
results by a weapon program advocate to ensure continued
procurements for a weapon system.
The acquisition cycle is set up in five basic phases:
Phase 0: For Concept Exploration, Definition, and
Evaluation.
Phase I: For Demonstration and Evaluation.
Phase II: For Engineering and Manufacturing Development.
Phase III: For Production and Development.
Phase IV: Operations and Support.
Each phase is separated by a Milestone meeting. To exit
from one phase and enter the next, certain performance critera
must be satisfied as well as other considerations. If the
criteria cannot be met, the program will stop, meet the
criteria, or possibly face cancellation. (Cochrane, 1991, pp.
1-3)
A program cannot enter the first phase of procurement
without meeting Milestone 0's, (Concept Studies and Awards
Approval) requirement to have a Mission Needs Statement (MNS)
.
This MNS must document a mission need to correct a war
fighting deficiency. A MNS is required on all programs
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requiring new start material solutions. (DOD Instruction
5000.1, 1991, pp. 2-2 through 2-5)
A MNS must meet the Milestone O exit criteria adjudged as
valid by the Under Secretary Of Defense for Acquisition
(USD (A)) and his decision making support infrastructure. He
will determine if a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) should
convene. The DAB will evaluate funding competitive
contractors for the most probable solutions to solving a MNS
and give their recommendations to the USD (A) . In the hope of
fostering competition, multiple contractor awards for concept
studies will be approved during Phase 0, (Concept Exploration,
Definition and Evaluation)
.
Before continuing on, it will be helpful to understand how
the DAB gives its recommendations for approval or disapproval
and what other support resources it draws on to make that
decision. A MNS will be written by the Military Department
and submitted to the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel
(JROC) . The JROC is made up of senior military commanders
from all branches of the Armed Services and chaired by the
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are required
to determine if the mission need is valid and assign the valid
MNS a priority that will assist the USD (A) in determining when
he should convene a DAB. (DOD Instruction 5000.2, 1991, pp.
3-2 through 3-5)
The USD (A) will be the final decision making authority in
approving a program. This person will use the inputs of the
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JROC and the DAB to assist him in his decision. The DAB is
composed of Senior Civilian Acquisition Executives (SAE's)
.
The DAB is led by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, two Defense Under Secretaries from the Pentagon
and other testing, evaluation and appropriation advisory
groups. They are assisted by three standing committees:
• Strategic Committee
• Command Control and Communications Committee
• Conventional Systems Committee
The DAB will have the input from the JROC to assist in writing
their recommendations. (DOD Instruction, 5000.2, 1991, pp.
13-A-l through 13-A-4)
The USD (A) will make a decision based on the inputs of the
JROC and the DAB. If the USD (A) approves the MNS he will do
it with a document called an Acquisition Decision Memorandum
(ADM) . The ADM will list a minimum set of the alternative
concepts to meet the MNS. It will choose the number of
concept study contracts to be awarded, designate the lead
study organization and evaluate a dollar amount for further
funding studies. An ADM does not appropriate money. The ADM
will also establish the exit criterion that must be met to
pass the next milestone approval at Milestone I. (DOD
Instruction 5000.2, 1991, pp. 3-9 through 3-12)
The next important document generated in Phase of the
acquisition process is the Operational Requirements Document
(ORD) . It will be submitted along with the MNS to the
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milestone evaluation DAB at Milestone zero. The ORD will
document the performance and related operational parameters
proposed for each new system that was funded for concept
exploration, evaluation and definition. It will also assess
logistics support requirements and criteria that serve as
further exit criteria from Milestone zero. The ORD will be
updated after each milestone to be more specific in its
requirements. (DOD Instruction 5000.2, 1991, pp. 4-B-l
through 4-B-2)
The entire milestone review process for each milestone
should take a period of one hundred and eighty days, or six
months. Remember that a milestone review must take place
before entering each of the next four phases (Phase through
Phase III- Phase IV is not discussed in this thesis) . Each
milestone review has a required document list that will answer
the questions asked by the DAB and Congressional Committees
that would address risk control. The required plans on the
document list are: (Cochrane, 1991, pp. 8)
Acquisition Plan
Configuration Management Plan
Computer Resources Life Cycle Management Plan
Human Systems Integration Plan





• Systems Engineering Management Plan
• Technology Assessment and Control Plan
• Test and Evaluation Master Plan
• Training Development Plan
All of these plans will try to control the risk associated
in each area. The scope and formality of these plans can be
tailored to each individual acquisition. It will not be
necessary to go into each of these plans for this thesis.
B. THE HISTORICAL PROCUREMENT PROCESS FOLLOWED IN PURCHASING
THE F-14 FELL SHORT OF CURRENT LEGALLY DOCUMENTED
PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES.
The general policies for acquiring weapon systems have
changed very little from 1969 to 1993. Satisfying the users
needs by using a new system when common systems do not meet
mission requirements is as possible now as it was in 1969.
Life cycle costs and risk control have always been examined in
order to make the best performance vs. cost trade-off possible
for a weapon system. The critical failures of past
acquisitions lie in the fact that there was not a
"disciplined" management approach to procurements. The
techniques and policies are similar but the application of
these techniques was left totally to the acquisition managers
discretion. With this identification of the major difference
between past and current procedures in mind, identification of
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the F-14 procurements shortfalls when compared to current
procedures can be understood.
Time frames are strictly defined and observed for the
submission and review of evidence pertaining to production
approval for a new weapon system. In the current system, it
takes two years to advance through the approval meetings from
Milestone 0, (Concept Studies and Awards Approval) through
Phases 0, I, and II before Milestone III is reached,
(Production Approval) . The F-14 program had an aircraft in
the air in two years. This would make the older system used
in 1969 seem more efficient because of its fast paced
production. While it is true that the Navy had its new
aircraft airborne in two years, the question of achieving the
performance requirements originally desired must be reviewed.
The Navy accepted the F-14 with the TF-30 engine brought over
from the F-111B program. The Navy did not like this under-
powered engine from the beginning. That is why the original
contract called for it to be installed in the first sixty-six
aircraft only! After that, a new engine would be installed to
meet the required flight performance requirements desired in
the 1969 contract requirements. It is now 1993, the TF-30
engine was installed in almost all of the F-14 aircraft that
were manufactured over its twenty-four year life span. It is
the researcher's conjecture that the accelerated performance
trade off in favor of a quicker production schedule would not
have been made so quickly if the F-14 procurement had occurred
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under current DOD 5000.2 time frame requirements. At a
minimum the F-14 production would have been drawn out two
extra years for a total of four years from signing the
contract to production of the aircraft, simply by following
current DAB time requirements. This minimum could easily
become longer because the aircraft was unsuccessful at meeting
its performance criteria and would have been unable to pass
through Milestone II, (Development Approval.) The researcher
is not saying that the perceived Soviet threat would not have
eventually outweighed the originally contracted engine
performance requirements and result in a performance
requirement waiver. The researcher does believe that waiting
for mandated time frames would have pressured Pratt and
Whitney, and possibly the Air Forces dual use aircraft engine
program, to produce a more acceptable engine in a quicker time
frame. Perhaps the already fielded British modification to
the F-4 Phantom could have been procured to bridge the gap for
a slower F-14 procurement, resulting in the Navy getting all
of the engine performance it wanted.
The strict milestone review process would have further
slowed the F-14 procurement until the contractor could deliver
a better performing engine. The new process involves a joint
military and DOD civilian decision process. Involvement of a
joint military determination in the JROC at each milestone
would have been another slowing point in the production
approval of the F-14. The Navy made and justified performance
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trade-offs that it refused to make in the F-111B program with
the Air Force. It is the researcher's belief that the Navy
accepted more performance trade-offs in the F-14 program than
it had to make in the F-111B program. The reason the F-14
performance trade-offs were easier to accept was because the
F-14 was the Navy's baby from conception to maturity. The
injection of another Service being the leader in the F-lllB
made it much more difficult for the Navy to get performance
trade-offs approved. The JROC will naturally slow down the
approval process of a weapon program, once again pressuring
the contractor to improve engine performance in a shorter
amount of time.
The next step in the decision process is the DAB. The
JROC input is not authority to precede with a procurement.
They merely validate the mission need, and prioritize it for
input to the DAB. The DAB is chaired by the USD (A) and two
other Service Secretaries who are assisted by testing,
evaluation and acquisition specialists. The civilian
Secretaries would need political pressure and a very
convincing argument to approve the performance trade-offs
required in using the TF-30 engine in the F-14. These
executives may not even be from the Navy. The lack of empathy
presented by a non-Navy DAB Secretary would further slow the
acquisition process down and force the Navy to wait to get
what they originally asked for in the F-14 contract.
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Ultimately, the signature authority decision falls to
USD (A) . He is appointed to this position because he is a
skilled management practitioner from the private sector who
may or may not have a military background. He may elect to
make the performance trade-offs but time would ultimately have
been added on to the procurement process.
To this point, only the performance trade-off in the TF-3
engine has been considered. There is a cursory list on page
fifty-four of this thesis that should be understood and used
as guidance at each milestone decision point. The Integrated
Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) addressed the lifetime
requirements of a weapon system in terms of the training,
manpower, level of spares and level of maintenance required to
keep an aircraft like the F-14 continuously available for use,
once delivered to the Navy. Interviews conducted with Navy
maintenance and Supply Corps personnel document the perceived
failure of the ILSP for the F-14. Many items that could
prevent an F-14 from flying were items that could not be
repaired by the Navy. These items reduced available flight
time of the F-14. Other items took a very long time to
transfer into the Navy stock system, indicating a lack of
planning for anything more than an expedited two year delivery
of an aircraft. These logistics support problems tarnished
the superlative performance of the F-14. (Interview, 1993)
When the aircraft was flying, even with its performance
degradations, there were few people who would not defend the
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positive fighting capabilities the F-14 gave to the Navy. The
F-14's opponents complaints came in the well supported
arguments that the F-14 aircraft was hard to keep airborne due
to supply and logistics support problems with spares,
computers, and software incorporated into the F-14. Once
again, this is only one example of an incomplete planning
effort that was not addressed in 1969 but would be forced to
be addressed by the new weapon systems acquisition system
delineated in the DOD 5000 series requirements.
Failure to successfully justify trade-offs in any one of
the currently mandated plans addressed on paged fifty-four
would be grounds for stopping progress on the production of
the F-14 in todays disciplined management approach to
acquiring a weapon system. The researcher believes that the
production approval of the F-14 would have been delayed if it
were forced to obtain the same milestone approvals required of
todays weapon procurements. The delays would have happened
in Phase II (Engineering and Manufacturing Development.) The
researcher also believes that the political and adversarial
pressure presented by the Soviets would have prevented
cancellation of the F-14. The end result would have delivered
to the Navy an even better product at a later date then the
Navy stipulated in their original contract.
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C. THE F-14 HISTORY INDICATES THAT CURRENT PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS HAVE NO LARGE PROBLEM AREAS.
The disciplined management approach currently required by
the DOD 5000 series does not mean that the new system is
inflexible. Each section of the DOD 5000 procurement series
stresses that managers are not forced to follow every
directive as long as deviations are properly justified as good
business decisions. The leeway for exercising authority
within this disciplined approach will still give direction but
it does prevent the use of complete flexibility.
Complete flexibility as practiced during the F-14
procurement put an aircraft in the sky in only two years.
The drawback was that spare parts reliability, maintainability
and aircraft performance problems plagued the F-14 throughout
its service life. The disciplined management approach
requires consideration of building an aircraft in the quickest
possible time while stressing system performance reliability
and maintainability issues to prevent problems in the years
the aircraft will be operated by the fleet.
The principal author of the DOD 5000 series emphasizes its
ability to change in response to changes in the procurement
environment. Changes are not required due to the flexibility
built into the series. The rules are general guidelines that
can change by applying common sense to the required
procurement framework. (Fedorochko, 1992, pp. 18-19)
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The current procurement system draws heavily upon the 1986
blueprint for change laid out by Deputy Defense Secretary
David Packard. As now implemented, the reformed system
applies equally to all branches of the Armed Service.
Consistency and simplicity streamlined the older procurement
system in which each Service had a different set of
procurement rules to follow.
Possible additions to the DOD 5000 series could be made in
procurement areas not originally put into the series. Areas
such as international programs and commercially based pilot
programs should be addressed to be effective in the upcoming
years of diminished defense dollars for procurements in order
to sustain the industrial base. (Fedorochko, 1992, pp. 19)
The cultural changes required by the DOD 5000 series can
prove important in the future years of dwindling defense
spending. Joint weapon programs are now stressed where there
once was too much inter-Service rivalry to think of this
option. This is not saying that inter-Service rivalries have
disappeared but the corner stone for cooperation amongst the
Services has been laid. Services now recognize that it is in
their best interests to work with, not compete with, the other
Services to get more results with less money.
The DOD 5000 series requires no large changes. Additions
can apply it to any situation not previously covered in the
initial directives. The fundamental principles of discipline
and responsibility must remain unchanged. With all Services
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processing procurements in a consistent fashion, the defense
department and the industrial base now have a unified
establishment working under the same basic guidelines.
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VI CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A. JROC SCREENING FOR MNS VALIDATION
The failure of the F-111B acquisition demonstrates the
inadequacies in joint weapon systems that existed prior to the
DOD 5000 series. The Armed Forces were competing against one
another for funds and procured separate weapon systems with
vastly differing procurement methodologies. The uniformity
and discipline that exist now will be important to a down
sizing DOD.
Important paradigm shifts are underway making joint
program consideration important to military Services. The
JROC embodies the new cultural shift in weapon procurement.
The vice chiefs of each branch of the military jointly review
every weapon systems Mission Needs Statement (MNS) . From the
initial approval of the MNS to the final approval to go into
production, joint military programs are considered and
promoted fairly across each department of the Armed Services.
The JROC distributes a proposed MNS for a major program to all
Service combatant leaders to solicit the viewpoint of the
weapon systems users. After all of these inputs are reviewed
along with all the possible alternatives, the JROC will have
completed it's job in validating the MNS before it is
forwarded for DAB input and ultimately USD (A) approval. The
67
longer the JROC and the new DOD 5000 series is around, the
better each Service will become in utilizing the shrinking
budget tax dollars available in the near future.
B. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION
DECISION PROCESS
Before the DOD 5000 series, weapon systems were not so
constrained by calendar schedules for approval milestone
meetings. While this did lead to a shorter lead time in
fielding an aircraft, it also lent itself to easily
overlooking life cycle, maintainability and reliability costs
which ultimately can degrade a weapon systems performance.
Quick procurements are still possible but they are
constrained form overlooking everything except fielding an
aircraft. Each milestone event requires the use of a set of
procurement plans designed to address all elements of a system
life cycle costs. The DOD 5000 series rules and schedules are
the most effective controls of risk implemented to date.
Uniformity, discipline and definition of responsibility
are essential to ensuring that the best business decisions are
made during a weapon procurement. By disallowing too much
acceleration of the procurement process, a better product is




C. RISK AVOIDANCE WITH PROTOTYPE MANUFACTURING
Prototype aircraft development is now required and is a
part of the "fly-before-you-buy" concept developed during the
F-14 procurement. An Institute For Defense Analysis (IDA)
paper studied the procurement time frames for nine aircraft
including the F-14 and the F-lll. Programs using prototypes
took 11.5% less time to go into development then non-prototype
programs. Schedule risk is reduced with prototypes.
Many programs choose not to use prototype development in
their weapon systems procurement. A waiver for use of
prototypes can be granted by the USD (A) if it can be shown
that a prototype will not be cost effective. The program
manager can submit waiver requests with proof showing that the
time savings using a prototype does not give enough of a cost
saving to warrant the use of a prototype. If the USD (A)
believes that a prototype is not cost effective, he will waive
the requirement and send the waiver to Congress for thirty
days. If there is no challenge from Congress, the waiver is
approved and the prototype will not be required.
(Establishing Competitive Production Sources, 1984, Ch-16)
The use or non-use of prototypes is the DOD 5000 series'
flexible response to time versus cost trade-off decisions.
The decision is made early in a programs life to take full
advantage of the decision no matter what decision is made.
Risk is thus effectively avoided by a common sense business
decision.
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D. COMPETITION DECISIONS THAT COULD HAVE HELPED THE PROGRAM
The new DOD 5000 series requires the effective use of
competition throughout every phase of a weapon systems
development. The requirement for competition should be built
into the initial acquisition plan and indicated to the
contractors via the Request for Proposal (RFP)
.
The F-14 program had suitable competition for the airframe
but failed to stress it in the subsystems category for the
F-14's engines. The TF-30 engines from the F-lll program were
suppose to be replaced by an upgrade of the current
contractors engine or a dual use engine provided by the Air
Force.
Competition should have forced the two engine contractors
to adopt production efficiencies to produce a high quality
responsive aircraft engine. The competition was not really
present in the contract for the F-14. The results of the lack
of competition was the Navy's continued use of the under
powered TF-3 engine throughout the contract because neither
competing company felt the pressures to develop a new engine
on time.
The DOD 5000 series mandates competition for purchase of
the best performing system. It is competition in the keenest
sense of the word. The vehicle that could have been used in
the F-14 contract was a Form-Fit-and-Function competition that
is currently described in the series. Two contractors would
be encouraged to differentiate their final product as long as
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it worked in the F-14 airframe. The use of a performance
specification would compel contractors to develop separate
engines that could compete and show a clear winner in terms of
performance, reliability and maintainability. The DOD 5000
series competition goes from the aircraft to sub systems such
as engines, radars, or any system where competition will
acquire the best value for the money spent.
E. FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research into the F-14 acquisition should prove to
benefit the acquisition and Contract Management curriculum at
the Navy Postgraduate School. The F-14 is one of the newest
contracting examples of the acquisition process that can be
tracked form its creation to its cancellation. This thesis
covers only five years of a dynamic weapon systems program
that covered over twenty five years. Follow on case studies
will enrich thesis students and the acquisition curriculum.
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APPENDIX A (TOMCAT ACQUISITION CASE STUDY)
TOMCAT ACQUISITION
THE INITIAL YEARS OF THE F-14 STORY
It is a late night in 1968. Your top Naval aviation
warfare specialists are trying to define a new aircraft that
will be the best all-around fighter in the United States
inventory. What capabilities does the new aircraft need to
possess? What other areas are of concern besides aircraft
performance and how can it be produced in the most cost
effective manner? As you ponder these questions your mind
scans back twenty to thirty years to assist you in your
determination
.
Protection of the Navy's highest value unit, the aircraft
carrier, has been a priority for the United States Navy since
World War II. Navy battle groups were designed to protect
aircraft carriers which can make devastating offensive strikes
on the enemy. As enemy weapon technology advanced, aircraft
carriers became vulnerable to Russian air attacks, both from
missiles launched from aircraft and from low flying cruise
missiles. This led to an increased number of aircraft being
devoted to defending the carrier itself. [Ref. 1]
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In the 1960 's, the primary protective aircraft for the
U.S. Navy was the F-4
.
The aircraft was liked by the pilots
who flew them but it lacked a gun and restricted the pilot's
vision; both of these factors are a primary requirement for
aerial combat or dogfighting. These restrictive factors
contributed to the high aircraft loss rate during the Viet Nam
War. Navy planners sought a new generation of aircraft that
could protect itself and the aircraft carrier. [Ref. 2]
This new generation aircraft would need to be able to
intercept and engage Russian targets using air-to-air missiles
and using dogfighting tactics when necessary to prevent the
Russians from launching their cruise missiles at United States
carriers. The aircraft had to be powerful enough to carry
air-to-air missiles yet light enough to take off and land on
a carrier. A new aircraft would require the strength to
survive carrier catapulted takeoffs and the violent landings
or controlled crashes that Navy pilots experience during
carrier operations. The capability of staying on station,
awaiting attackers at 200 miles or more from the carrier while
using fuel effectively to stay at this distant station for
several hours, was another important requirement.
The Navy's solution to meet its mission met much political
opposition during the Kennedy administration. Kennedy's
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was determined to
reduce inter-Service rivalries. Inter-Service fights often
led to separate purchases of costly systems to meet similar
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inter-Service mission needs. [Ref. 3] One of Secretary
McNamara's most hotly contested political issues was his goal
to reduce rivalry among the military Services. McNamara's
first action to attain his goal was to require the Navy to
share the same aircraft with the Air Force, who was also in
the market for a new fighter and bomber. McNamara believed a
joint project would show the virtues and savings represented
by inter-Service commonality. [Ref . 4]
The Air Force's mission statement had some commonality
with the Navy's. Both Services were seeking a fuel efficient
aircraft capable of remaining airborne for long periods while
carrying significant amounts of weight in fuel and weaponry.
The Air Force was extremely interested in an aircraft design
that would reduce their dependency on long, easily attackable
airstrips, duplicating the Navy's requirement for an aircraft
that could take off and land on a short field. Unfortunately,
not all the mission needs were similar. While the Navy needed
a high altitude missile interceptor that could dogfight, the
Air Force sought a bomber that could fly fast under enemy
radar and drop nuclear weapon ordinance in hostile
territory. [Ref. 5]
The Air Force design had already taken shape in the form
of the variable swept wing F-lll. Their long swept wing
configuration was particularly adaptable to the common mission
need for short take offs and landings. In the short swept
wing mode, the F-lll was capable of flying long-distance
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flights at supersonic speeds. With Secretary of Defense
McNamara 's approval, the Navy was virtually forced to accept
an aircraft that was too heavy for carriers and did not meet
all the Navy's needs. [Ref. 6] Major modifications
were denied to the Navy because McNamara stated the Air Force
aircraft was to be compromised as little as possible to meet
the Navy's needs. [Ref. 7]
Secretary McNamara intervened in the contracting process,
awarding General Dynamics the prime contract while giving
Grumman the contract for both the airframe and the assembly
work on the Navy version of the F-lll.[Ref. 8] The
Navy got some consolation from McNamara's selection of
Grumman. Grumman had built several successful generations of
Navy aircraft. Grumman 's active recruitment of retired U.S.
Navy Officers as executives gave them a great deal of
sensitivity to the combat requirements of Navy pilots.
The design and construction phase of the F-lll did not
proceed smoothly. Stories were circulated in the Pentagon
that the Navy, opposed to the aircraft and unable to block it,
was obstructing construction progress. Unsubstantiated
reports credited the Navy with proposing dysfunctional design
features, requesting expensive modifications, making reports
of safety problems and delaying carrier trials, while leaking
unfavorable stories to the press. [Ref . 9] The Navy
was openly seeking alternatives to the F-lll during its design
and construction. In 1965, the Naval Air Systems Command
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(NAVAIRSYSCOM) awarded contracts for $1,750,000 to Grumman and
McDonnell-Douglas to evaluate the F-lll and consider options.
Grumman, the proud designer of so many Navy aircraft, took
this job seriously by examining over 3,000 different ideas for
new aircraft. [Ref . 10]
Test results on the F-lll in 1966 and 1967 were
unsatisfactory in the areas of high altitude performance.
Further ammunition against the F-lll took shape during a
Soviet Union air show in 1967. [Ref. 11] The Soviets
unveiled new fighter aircraft that flew higher and faster than
the F-lll. The new Soviet aircraft were also designed for
dogfighting, a mission need dropped by the Air Force in favor
of air-to-air missiles. Grumman took into consideration the
Soviet aircraft and the Navy's overall displeasure with the
F-lll program during their F-lll effectiveness study.
Grumman 's F-lll assessment was presented to the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Connolly, in October
1967. The company president, Mr. Lew Evans, led the Grumman
presentation team that included another chief company
executive, their chief designer, and Joe Rees, a retired Naval
officer who served with Admiral Connolly. They evaluated the
F-lll's inability to fulfill the Navy's need for a missile
interceptor that was also capable of close combat. Grumman
went a gigantic step further by presenting an unsolicited
proposal for a new, lighter, more agile aircraft.
[Ref. 12] This aircraft would not have bombay doors
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like the F-lll, making it a better fighter. It would retain
the F-lll's Phoenix missiles, avionics capabilities, the TF-30
engines, and a modified variable sweep wing. None of the
innovations proposed would try to surpass the current state of
the art. Lighter materials, such as titanium, would be used
to make this new aircraft's weight and strength compatible
with Navy aircraft carrier operational reguirements. An
upgraded version of the F-lll weapon system, the AWG-9, could
select targets for the simultaneous firing of six Phoenix
missiles, while continuing to scan for other enemy traffic.
Evans argued it would cost no more to produce this new
aircraft than it would to continue development of the Navy's
version of the F-lll. The Navy immediately formed a fighter
study group to technically evaluate the Grumman technical and
financial proposal and the financial implications of closing
down the F-lll program. [Ref. 13]
Three other aircraft manufacturers heard of Grumman 's
unsolicited proposal and submitted unsolicited proposals of
their own. In the midst of all the F-lll controversy,
Secretary McNamara, the leading supporter of commonality and
the F-lll, announced his intentions to leave the Department of
Defense. In April of 1968, the Senate officially voted to
discontinue the Navy version of the F-lll aircraft.
[Ref. 14]
NAVAIRSYSCOM had anticipated the cancellation of the F-lll
program by establishing a program office for their follow on
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version of the F-lll. Navy Captain Lionel Ames was selected
as the program manager. The NAVAIR sense of urgency was
acute, they believed that six years had been wasted in the
procurement of the F-lll. Captain Ames personally carried
procurement documents to the various DOD Secretaries and
Congressional members for their approval. By the time the
Senate Appropriations' Committee approved funds for the new
aircraft, the program office had a Request for Proposal (RFP)
ready to submit to contractors. The normal six month period
for approval of an RFP was reduced to ten days.
[Ref. 15]
The requirements in the RFP were very similar to Grumman '
s
original proposal. The requirements included:
[Ref. 16]
1. Two Pratt & Whitney TF 3 engines, basically the same
as in the F-lll.
2. The AWG-9 weapon system with Phoenix missiles, that
are basically the same as in the F-lll.
3. Two-man crew, seated front and rear, narrowing the
fuselage and lessening drag.
4. Have the capacity to carry six Phoenix missiles, or
combinations of several other missiles and one internal
M-61A 20mm cannon. The cannon gave the aircraft the
dogfighting capability the Navy wanted.
5. Carrier take off and landing requirements.
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Five contractors responded to the RFP released to
contractors on June 21, 1968. Five one million dollar
definition contracts went out to Ling Temco Vought, Grumman,
McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics, and North American
Rockwell with a reguired proposal submission date of October
1, 1968. [Ref. 17]
Four of the five contractors proposed a swept wing design.
The low cost proposal design was so long it raised concern
about parking space problems onboard a carrier. All the
contractors were allowed a wide variety of communication with
the program office with the ability to withdraw a proposal and
work on it some more if desired. Each contractor's design
looked increasingly similar to each other as a result of their
program office communications. If the RFP had continued any
longer, it may have been hard to tell the difference between
each of the contractors offers. [Ref. 18]
On December 15, 1968, the Defense Department made a news
release that the competition had been reduced to Grumman and
McDonnell-Douglas. The two finalists were to prepare and
submit their final proposals by January 5, 1969.
[Ref. 19]
The Grumman version initially cost much more than the
McDonnell-Douglas aircraft. Grumman originally submitted a
Quotation of $2,781,950,100. Their modified submission
included two kinds of changes for a price reduction of
$326,300,000. For the first change, Grumman lowered the
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ceiling prices of the aircraft by $362.3 million. The second
change involved reallocating $112.1 million of general and
administrative costs on equipment and parts that were
furnished by the Government. This change redistributed some
of its overhead costs to other corporate activities. Grumman
indicated that this accounting change was recommended to them
by the Department of Defense. [Ref. 20] After a
little more cost shaving was done, the new Grumman proposal
stood at $2,419,950,100 compared to McDonnell-Douglas's
proposed cost of $2,319,422,000, a difference of only
$100,528,100.
The Department of Defense announced that Grumman had won
the contract on January 14, 1969. There was no opposition at
any stage in the Navy's internal review process. The Navy's
Source Selection Advisory Council had reached a unanimous
decision based on Grumman 's past performance, their
substantial technical and operational superiority, their
lesser development risk, and greater potential.
[Ref. 21] The Grumman basic fighter design was
superior to the McDonnell-Douglas' aircraft in terms of speed,
climb and maneuverability. Risk on new development in the
McDonnell-Douglas aircraft could cause major re-design, and
increase cost while prolonging the delivery schedule. Cost
was not the major decision making factor. McDonnell-Douglas
ceiling prices were five percent lower than Grumman' s, and
target costs were almost identical. When the Navy compared
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its independent cost estimate for the F-14 to the
contractually agreed to price, it appeared that the Navy saved
$472,950,000 with its competition plan. [Ref . 22]
Contract negotiations between Grumman and the Navy went
quickly due to their long history of non adversarial
relations. A Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) contract type
was chosen. This was a variant of the Total Package
Procurement (TPP) strategy developed by Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara. This contracting strategy was designed to
stop the cost overruns that had plagued development projects
of the 1950 's and 60' s due to the use of cost plus a
percentage of cost contracts. [Ref . 23] The older
system allowed for the payment of direct costs for overhead,
plus an additional percentage as a fee, or profit, which
incentivised contractors to increase expenses to make more
money. [Ref. 24]
The TPP and FPIF strategy was designed to contain
expenditures by minimizing cost and technical risk. The
Government would pay a fixed-price in advance for a set number
of units over a set number of years. The contract was to run
for eight years. If the contractor's expenses fell below
fixed-price, they would make increased profits. If Grumman
exceeded the fixed-price, they could not turn to the
Government for financial relief; they would have to absorb the
loss. In this way, it was envisioned by the Government that
Grumman would be incentivised to make a realistic bid based on
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good data concerning their overhead expenses and on careful
inflation predictions over the life of the contract. It also
allowed the government some flexibility in rate
procurement. [Ref . 25]
TPP had an advantage for Grumman because it simplified
financial reporting requirements. TPP forced the contractor
to make prudent business decisions to avoid cost increases.
The Government had less of a requirement to oversee Grumman,
presenting Grumman with a hands-off attitude in
TPP. [Ref. 26] This was because Grumman had all the
risk for cost control so there was not as great of a reason
for close Government scrutiny of corporate financial
records. [Ref. 27]
The first year's production of Lot I aircraft was
designated for research and development. Grumman was to begin
full production after Lot I. The number of aircraft to be
produced was undefined at the outset of the contract. In 1968
NAVAIRSYSCOM had forecast the purchase of 1,400 aircraft. By
the time the contract was signed on February 3, 1969, the
original forecast had been scaled down without setting a firm
number of purchases. A median number of purchases were set
for the first eight years. The Navy could determine the
actual quantity for each year's production one year in advance
and notify Grumman in the annual contract discussions. This
variable lot contract is summarized in Table I on the next
page. [Ref. 28]
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1 69 — 6 —
2 70 3 6 9
3 71 15 30 45
4 72 48 96 144
5 73 48 96 144
6 74 48 96 144
7 75 48 96 144
Source: Buying of the F-14
To keep the F-14 from gaining weight during development,
a lesson learned from the F-lll, the contract included
incentives for maintaining the contracted agreement for
maximum aircraft weight. The contract specified a target
weight and rewarded Grumman to keep the new aircraft light.
Forty of the sixty points of selection criterion available
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were for incentive payments dependent on keeping aircraft
weight as low as possible.
The Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) contract specified
a first year target price and ceiling price for the aircraft.
If Grumman hit the target price it could make a ten percent
profit on its expenses. For every additional expense over the
target price, the company would pay the additional expense
while the Government would pay a decreasing share of the
costs. The ceiling price, or maximum amount Grumman could
collect each year, was set at 125% of the target price for
every year after the first year. The ceiling price would
remain the same for every year, no matter what actual quantity
of aircraft was procured. [Ref. 29]
The ceiling price Grumman could charge was designed to be
immovable throughout the duration of the contract. This
requirement was put into the contract due to tough
Congressional pressure against military contractors to hold
down costs. Grumman studied the Bureau Of Labor Statistics
figures for preceding years and based their projected
inflation rates on these figures. The rate was set at two
percent per year on materials and three percent on
labor. [Ref. 30] No other special adjustments for
inflation were to be permitted until the negotiations for Lot
VI in fiscal year 1974.
The contract did allow cost changes that arose from design
evolution during F-14 production. Changes originated by the
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Navy (or from modifications to Government Furnished Equipment
{GFE} supplied by the Navy) could be billed to the contract.
Changes that Grumman initiated on its own, would require the
corporation to absorb the costs. The contract timelines were
strict. The pressure to make up for the lost years in the
F-lll generated a requirement to produce the F-14 in twenty-
four months. To speed the process up further, Navy testing
and evaluation of the F-14 was not scheduled to begin until
the aircraft was in production. Any changes made as a result
of the tests would be retrofitted onto existing aircraft.
[Ref. 31]
The procurement of the F-14 provided Grumman with other
compensation for activities and expenses beyond the cost of
manufacturing. Tooling costs would be paid for over the
second and third year of the contract with target and ceiling
prices set in advance. Due to the significant capital
investment required for titanium fabrication this amount of
money was significant to Grumman. The capability to
subcontract titanium work was not excluded from the
contract. [Ref . 32]
Overhead costs were computed by using records Grumman had
of its recent business base and its current total
manufacturing activity. The percentage of corporate overhead
billed to the F-14 would be roughly proportional to the size
of that contract compared to Grumman 's total volume of
business. Quantities were unspecified for spare parts,
85
training and support materials. They would be negotiated year
by year as the Navy's needs became clearer. [Ref. 33]
The prime contractor, Grumman, was responsible for design,
production and assembly of the aircraft. The Navy would
supply Pratt & Whitney engines, Hughes Aircraft avionics
systems and the Phoenix missile system as Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) sub-assemblies. [Ref . 34]
Pratt & Whitney had to adapt the TF-30 engine used in the
F-lll for use in the F-14. The TF-30 engine was full of
troubles so NAVAIRSYSCOM required Pratt & Whitney to develop
a new version after the first sixty-six aircraft. The Navy
looked for two alternatives to power the F-14 after the first
sixty-six aircraft. One option was to wait for a short time
until a joint U.S. Air Force/ Navy advanced technology engine
was ready for Service in 1972. In addition, the second option
involved the Navy's commissioning of Pratt & Whitney to
develop a new higher-powered engine that would give the F-14
the power its creators had anticipated. This engine was to be
ready by 1974. The decision not to wait until a proven engine
was ready was made because the Navy needed aircraft and any
additional delay waiting for engines was deemed unacceptable.
[Ref. 35]
Grumman made subcontractor agreements for the parts and
subassemblies that were not provided as GFE. Between August
1968 and January 1969, Grumman had identified potential
subcontractors and used their price quotes as a basis to
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prepare their final bid for the Government. In February of
1969, when Grumman signed the contract with the Navy, they had
not concluded any binding agreements on prices or quantities
with its subcontractors.
Grumman had lowered its bid considerably from its original
cost estimates to win the F-14 contract. By September of
1969, only nine months after the F-14 award announcement,
Grumman started indicating to the Navy that their cost figures
may have been inadequate. This news was precipitated by an
overall change in the aerospace market and was met with
Congressional concern. [Ref . 36]
In the 1970's, the aerospace industrial base was
declining. Defense spending had significantly reduced after
Viet Nam. Grumman produced the Navy's A-6E attack aircraft,
the E-2C early warning aircraft and the E-A6B electronic
warfare aircraft. Each one of these procurements was reduced
significantly. The pride of Grumman, the NASA contract for
the Apollo lunar lander, was the other big contract it
depended on to support its business base. After the United
States placed a man on the moon, the contract from NASA was
drastically reduced below forecasted levels. The down turn in
production levels happened at the same time as aircraft work
pay rates shot up to much higher levels than Grumman 's initial
projections for the F-14 program.
Inflation rates were projected to be two percent per year
for the first five years of the F-14 program. According to
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Bureau of Labor statistics, these forecasts were well below
actual figures. See Table II [Ref. 37]










1969 100 100 100
1970 102 103 105.9
1971 104 106 110.5
1972 106.1 109.2 114.1
1973 108.2 112.6 121.2
1974 110.4 115.9 134.5
Source: Buying of the F-14
To further compound matters, the contract did not allow
for abnormal escalation controls to be implemented until LOT
V in 1973. [Ref. 38]
In September 1969, seven months after signing the F-14
contract, Grumman ' s president told the Navy he was concerned
over contractual commitments as far as Lot IV and all
subsequent lots. In July of 1970, Grumman communicated fears
of financial difficulties after examining the severe economic
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impact of the changing aerospace business. The Total
Procurement Package (TPP) concept was becoming impossible
based on the cuts in the Defense spending and economic
conditions. [Ref . 39]
The president of Grumman communicated these same fears to
NAVAIRSYSCOM in January of 1971. During this visit to
Washington D.C., he stressed that the price ceiling was so low
that Grumman was unable to deliver F-14s at that
price. [Ref. 40] A NAVAIRSYSCOM pricing team visited
Grumman to substantiate their concerns. The team discovered
that Grumman had taken steps to reduce their overhead by
reducing their employment totals from 31,500 in 1969 to 25,300
in 1971. They also reduced their physical plant facilities by
630,000 square feet. [Ref . 41]
Grumman was in trouble and capable of seeking relief under
Public Law 85-804, Extraordinary Contract Relief. This law
could allow a contractor who was being driven out of business
by their Government contract to receive help in terms of
lengthening performance time in a contract or other assistance
necessary to keep essential Government contractors like
Grumman in business. [Ref . 42] Grumman did not seek
Government relief. In July of 1971, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense David Packard requested Grumman commit to the
production of fourty-eight aircraft for Lot IV if Congress
authorized and appropriated the funding. Grumman committed to
build the aircraft at a loss on 27 July 1971.
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The F-14 was having problems in the areas of cost and
technology. In December of 197 0, just twenty three months
after the contract was awarded, the F-14 prototype crashed
unexpectedly. The Navy had sped up the procurement of the
F-14. This required the Navy and Grumman to deliberately
overlap testing and production. Before the crash there was
early Congressional Appropriation Committee concern about the
F-14 program. In December Congressional feelings were:
It is the considered judgment of the Committee that
the Navy is moving too fast into production of the
F-14 aircraft. The Committee does not share Navy
optimism. . .that the F-14 aircraft represents a low risk
program. [Ref. 43]
Original schedules called for the production of about sixty-
six aircraft before the Navy's final tests were completed.
After the crash, the aircraft produced before testing would
cost more due to an expensive back fit requirement on all
aircraft built before the crash to prevent further crashes.
Back fit programs like these are thought of by Congress as
schemes to "get well" as far as contract costs are concerned.
Congressional upheaval to the F-14 program arose quickly
fueled by their early skepticism toward the Navy's low risk
assessment of the F-14 contract. Congressmen raised the
possibility that Grumman' s final bid may have been
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deliberately pegged below their real estimates on the
assumption that prices could be raised once the contract was
signed. Senators Mark Hatfield and William Proximire attacked
the program, going so far as to propose closing the F-14 line
and using modified F-4 Phantoms until another aircraft could
be developed. Their objections to the program were further
fueled by the problems the F-14 was having with it's TF-30
engines. In order to shorten procurement lead time, TF-3
engines from the F-lll program were used in F-14 production.
These engines were only to be installed in the first sixty-six
F-14s until Pratt & Whitney delivered a new engine in 1970
that would meet the original power and thrust requirements the
Navy had contracted for. Pratt & Whitney never did develop a
more powerful engine. This made the Navy increase the number
of aircraft to be equipped with the less satisfactory TF-30
engine. This further fueled the objections of Senators
Hatfield and Proxmire. Even the F-14's staunchest advocates
had to admit that this change seriously compromised the F-14's
performance. Fortunately for the F-14 program, funding was
not stopped. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard had learned
his lesson about concurrent development and testing and
initiated his "fly-before-you-buy" program, [Ref. 44]
preventing future programs from going into the production
phase before final testing of the prototype was complete.
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One career officer became a casualty as a result of the
technical scheduling and risk mistakes that took place. The
program manager, Captain Lionel Ames, was replace by Captain
Leonard A. Snead. The F-14 program would continue in the
face of Congressional opposition.
On 5 December 1972, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) Program Budget Decision reduced the FY
programmed procurement of F-14s from eighty-eight to fourty-
eight aircraft. [Ref . 45] This purchase under Lot V
was received by Grumman with a refusal to honor the existing
contract without a price increase. Grumman said they had lost
$85 million on the program already and would lose $105 million
more if they did not get a price hike.
In similar contract disputes, the Pentagon had acceded to
contractor demands by rewriting the contract completely or
ordering system modification that increased the contract
price. In the case of the F-14, the Navy was denied this kind
of choice. Congressional pressures had mandated only enough
money for the purchase of fourty-eight aircraft according to
original contract prices. [Ref. 46] The Defense
Department was forced to announce it would hold Grumman to the
originally contracted price on December 11, 1972.
There was support for the F-14 in Congress as well as the
opposition. A Congressional bailout of Grumman was being
maneuvered in the House and the Senate by the New York
Congressional representatives. New York Senators Javits and
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Buckley announced on the 13th of December 1972, that they
would propose legislation in 1973 to permit Grumman of
Bethpage, New York, a higher price for F-14's. Similar action
would be forthcoming from the four New York Congressmen
Grover, Leat, Wydler and Roncallo. President Nixon was
supportive of the move to assist Grumman.
Following intensive negotiations between Grumman and the
Navy, Grumman agreed to produce the fourty-eight aircraft in
Lot V at the originally contracted price provided Congress
authorized and appropriated necessary funding for a new
contract in fiscal year 1974. [Ref. 47]
The F-14's cost in constant 1969 dollars when the program
began was $9.7 million per aircraft. Changes in the contract
were authorized after Lot V, which led eventually to F-14
costs escalating to $17.9 million per unit by 1981.
[Ref. 48]
The new F-14 program manager, Captain Leonard Snead,
countered Congressional critics and started building support
for the program with an aggressive public relations program.
Every time the Congress would try another ploy to kill the
program, the program office would make a ten minute film
showing off the aircrafts many attributes. Senator Proxmire
continued his assertions that the F-14 was nothing more than
a "Gold Plated" mistake that should be canceled. The battle
continued but the bottom line was the Navy began accepting
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APPENDIX B (CASE STUDY TEACHING NOTE^
TOMCAT ACQUISITION
All of the questions should be asked of the class studying the
F-14 case study. Never give out all of the answers until the class
has had the chance to give all of the answers themselves. In
certain cases there are no correct answers. These questions are
inserted in order to stimulate thought and conversation.
1) What is a Mission Needs Statement (MNS)?
a) Have a student write their Navy F-14 MNS on the board and
assess it for:
1) Is it broad or narrow in scope?
2) Does it address a specific item or does it present
the threat that needs to be countered by a new weapon
system. An MNS addresses the threat, not the platform to
counter the threat.
b) Have a student write down their Air Force MNS on the board
and assess it for items 1) and 2) above.
2) Did both Services have a well developed concept of what threat
existed and what they needed? Explain your idea. (A judgement
discussion type of question with no correct answer)
.
3) SECDEF McNamara had a need to fulfill. What was it? (Have the
student list the motives behind McNamara's actions).
a) Initiate discussion on how our U.S. Democratic society




4) Checks and balances
5) Which branch does the Air Force and Navy fall under?
b) Extending the definition of a MNS, what was SECDEF
McNamara's MNS?
1) Limit discussion here. Idea is that SECDEF can be an
ally or a threat to the users 7 need satisfaction.
c) What role does the media play in decisions made in the
United States.
1) Can polarize public opinion and effect Congress:
- Media stories about bad operating characteristics of
the Navy's F-lll.
2) Have the class list where the media helped or hurt
public opinion and affected Congressional decisions:
Also list the following items:
-Bad angle of window on F-lll making carrier landings
hazardous.
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-F-lll was too heavy and too large for safe landings and
parking. (Use an overhead projector)
.
4) When the Navy openly sought alternatives to the F-lll by
awarding contacts to McDonnell-Douglas and Grumman, what modern
phase of the procurement cycle would the procurement have been in?
a) The answer is: The Demonstration & Validation Phase,
Phase I















5) Discuss the idea of an "unsolicited proposal."
a) Legal requirements.
b) Did the Government do "the right thing" by taking other
unsolicited proposals?
6) Were there any ethical considerations that came out during
Grumman' s unsolicited proposal?
a) Grumman brought an old friend of the Admirals to the
proposal meeting.
b) Grumman may have had an organizational conflict of
interest.
7) Grumman stated that none of the proposed F-14 aircraft systems
surpassed current state of the art?
a) Question. Define state of the art? (Surpass current
technology)
1) What risk is avoided by not surpassing the state of
the art. (Technology risk)
2) Was the state of the art actually surpassed?
(Probably in the area of titanium fabrication)
.
8) Captain Lionel Ames was designated as the F-14 program manager.
What were his priorities?
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a) Make up lost time (6 years) from F-lll.
b) Get a quick RFP on the street for contractors.
c) Why are RFP's issued?
1) When competition is desired to keep costs low.
2) To define for the contractors exactly what the
Government expects to receive.
9) What would the DOD 5000 series goals be for the program
manager, Captain Ames?
a) The Service branch representative is responsible for
planning , developing , and acguiring the system.
b) The program manager represents NAVAIR to the contractors.
c) The program manager is responsible for transforming the
MNS into the RFP.




-Supportability for the life time of the system
10) What areas were stressed in the case study and which ones were
not, as compared to the DOD 5000 series of current program manger
requirements?
a) Cost was not as big of a concern.
b) Supportability was not as big of a concern.
1) Supportability of the TF-30 engines and the AWG-9
avionics package was a perineal problem throughout the
life time of the F-14.
11) The SECDEF had changed by this time but if McNamara had still
been the SECDEF, what could have gone wrong between the SECDEF and
the program manager?
a) The failure of the F-lll for the Navy resulted from a
SECDEF who wanted his own mission needs stressed above those
of the program manager. If the two are not working together,
survival of a weapon system is doubtful.
12) Five contractors responded to the RFP during the original
solicitation. (See page 7 of case study) . What ethical/legal
violations by todays standards occurred during the solicitation for
the F-14?
a) Technical transfusion . During the course of the
discussions with the offerors the Navy gave "hints" or tips as
to what they wanted. These tips made the five separate
offerors proposals become more and more alike.
13) When the field of five manufacturers was narrowed down to
Grumman and McDonnell -Douglas, what phase of the current
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contracting DOD 5000 series phase do you believe the contract was
in?
a) Just passed through milestone II, entering into Phase II,
Engineering and Manufacturing Development.
b) Have class discuss the reasons behind their choice.
-Narrowed field to two possible competitors from earlier














(Tie in question 14 with above drawing)
14) Why was competition still being used?
a) List class answer
-Competition is best way to keep costs down and prevent
contractor from maximizing profits.
15) What source selection critera should the Government use to get
the best contractor?
a) This entire list should go on an overhead after the class
input has been put on the board:
• Whether the contractor's proposals effectively meet the MNS
.
• Cost of development should be compared, along with Life Cycle
Costs (LCC)
.
• Manning and training requirements.
• Spare part support and what level of reliability is expected.
• Maintainability and supportability in the fleet.
• Safety requirements.
• Contractor's past performance.
• Contractor's facilities are evaluated. Are they adequate, or
can they become adequate?
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• Contractor's technical capabilities and production
requirements
.
• Contractor's management skills and expertise.
b) Which of these traits appears to have been stressed in the
case study, and which ones were not? (List Yes or No with
felt tip on the overhead transparency)
c) What is a best value purchase? (Government gets the most
it can for the dollars it expends, do not award on price
alone)
1) Was the F-14 a best value buy?
(Rhetorical question for discussion, no exact answer)
2) Ask for a show of hands, then have someone give Pro's
and Con's, and explain their choice.
Pros (Yes F-14 was best Value) Con
16) In relation to the current Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) 401
and 4 02, what errors were made in the F-14 case.
a) Redistributing overhead costs during the proposal
b) Have the class answer the question, (Was Grumman trying to
"Buy In" to the F-14 program?)
1) After the discussion, point out that officially,
"buying in" was never proved.
c) On page 8 of the case study, a reference is made to the
Navy's independent estimate of costs. When does the
Government make an Independent Government Cost Estimate?
-Whenever an exact price is unknown or must be
forecasted.
-During price analysis and cost analysis to assess the
Government's position that it will try to achieve during
contract negotiations.
17) The winner of the competition, Grumman, agreed to a Fixed-
Price-Incentive-Firm (FPIF) Contract. Why was this type of
contract used?
a) The Government wanted to prevent the contractor from
spending all the money it could to build an aircraft. The
risk is on the contractor to control costs in a Fixed-Price-
Incentive type of contract.
b) What are the essential number for using an FPIF contract?
-Target Cost (TC) = $352 Million
-Target Profit (T Profit) = $ 35 Million
-Target Price (TP) = $387 Million
-Share ratio Gov/Contr = 70/30
-Ceiling Price (CP) = $440 Million
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c) What is the formula for Point of Total Assumption (PTA)?
PTA = CP - (TC ± T Profits
Gov Share Ratio + TC
d) What is the formula for profit at PTA?
Profit at PTA = CP - PTA
c) Have an overlay of the graph for these figures.
18) What are the advantages of a Multi-Year Procurement (MYP)
?
(Point out that the original F-14 contact was for eight years)
a) The contractor can buy tools; he knows he has a firm cash
flow for a period of time.
b) The contractor will be more inclined to invest in his
plant and equipment.
c) Labor and material can be managed more efficiently,
because the stability exists with a MYP program.
What are the disadvantages of a MYP?
a) Inflation can not be forecasted.
b) Market trends are hard to forecast.
c) Trade union actions can are unpredictable.
What was the aircraft industry going through in the late
1960's and early 1970's?
a) Viet Nam was over, so the demand for military aircraft was
down.
b) The NASA push to put a man on the moon was over, this
directly affected Grumman.
c) With the demand for aircraft down, overhead rates rose,
requiring layoffs and other cost cutting efforts.
19) Schedule risk, and its control, can impact a major weapon
procurement. What was done to control schedule risk in the F-14
procurement?
a) The Government used the VARLOT system (as seen in table 1
it means "variable lot size") when they told Grumman a
minimum, median and maximum amount of aircraft they would be
ordering over the eight years of the contract.
1) Does the idea of a VARLOT purchase forecast compare
or contrast with the stability desired in a MYP?
-Contrast. The stability sought is somewhat
negated. When Grumman was forecasting their own
purchases to coincide with the VARLOT system, they
had a wide area for error in ordering. Grumman was
required to control cost or risk losing money.
Changes of this kind, even with a one year notice,
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effect the "through put" or production flow of
Grumman. They can not make efficient production
runs or batch purchases in this environment. The
changes can cause cost increases of items if
Grumman over orders materials and under produces
F-14's. It is also very hard for Grumman to change
contracts it has with its sub-contractors. They
may have an inefficiency thrown into the equation
because they have to store a lot of subcontractor
delivered items that they won't use in production.
b) The Government chose to use the first six production
aircraft as test aircraft. What was the Government trying to
control ->
-Cost risk and schedule risk are involved with the use of a
"Prototype aircraft". Prototype procurement takes longer than
the method chosen for the F-14 and cost more. Prototypes do
remove a lot of production risk because the prototype must be
accepted before entering production.
-"Concurrent Scheduling " of Navy test and evaluation of the
F-14 during production phase had schedule and cost risk
involved. -If an aircraft has a problem the schedule can be
adversely affected.
20) What types of incentives came out in the case study?
a) Aircraft weight controls.
b) The following were also incentivised, but not portrayed in
the case study.
-Aircraft carrier approach speed
-Acceleration time and altitude
-Maintainability
21) In the area of risk controls in the case study, what areas
were overlooked or not addressed?
a) Inflation (Forecasted at 2% to 3% per year on material and
labor) . No adjustments for inflation were to be allowed for
the first six years of the contract. (Lot VI)
.
b) Ceiling price was to be kept constant for eight years.
c) Forecasts on market trends were not very good.
22) Was there a contract change clause? What were its provisions?
a) YES. It provided for payments to the contractor in cases
where the Government initiated the change. Contractor changes
had to be incorporated at no cost to the Government.
b) What problems were brought on by this change clause?
F-14 changes would require expensive retro-fits for aircraft
that were produced without the changes.
105
23) What is Government Furnished Equipment (GFE)?
a) The Government will furnish systems built by other prime
or subcontractors to the prime contractor, for installation
into the aircraft.




c) What type of risk is placed on the Government with GFE?
-If GFE is delivered late, a Government change will have been
initiated and the Grumman could collect claims because the
Government adversely affected their schedule.
d) Would a claim like this have to go to court to be settled?
1) NO. The Contracting Officer could make an "equitable
adjustment" for the delay. The Government and the
contractor would both have to agree on the amount of
adjustment and the Government would pay Grumman that
amount.
c) Although not identified in the case, the Government had
set up a "Liquidated Damages" requirement in the contract.
This included:
-Slips in delivery would cost Grumman $5,000 per aircraft per
day, not to exceed $3,000,000 total.
24) Was the TF-30 engine a "risk free" item of GFE?
a) YES and NO. YES because it was already being produced for
the F-lll. NO because it had under power and stall problems
already diagnosed in the F-lll program.
b) How did the Navy try to control the risk involved with the
TF-30 engine?
1) Instructed the engine manufacturer, to design a
better engine.
2) Navy thought they could piggy-back on the Air Force
program to build a better jet engine.
c) The Navy had no plan in place if the TF-30 engine program
failed. Did the Navy have a "Competitive Strategy" to control
the risk involved by using the TF-30 engine? Why or why not?
d) Why was the TF-3 rushed into use for the F-14 program
despite its short comings?
1) URGENCY. The MNS justified quick procurement because
of the Soviet air threat. Urgency of need when
justified, is an appropriate decision.
26) Grumman is responsible in sharing risk with the Government and
controlling that risk. Did Grumman take any risk that the
Government would like to have known about?
a) Yes. Subcontractor bids were not formalized before
Grumman made it's bid on the F-14. This is not unusual,
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Grumman may not have won the F-14 contract if it had waited
for firm bids from all subs. The risk associated with a
fixed-price contact for multiple years increased due to
unforeseen market changes such as demand going down for
aircraft after the Viet Nam war ended and inflation growing to
unexpected proportions.
b) Bad forecasting due to inflation and labor price increases
for aircraft workers after the Viet Nam War should have been
addressed. The phenomenon of a shrinking military after the
end of a war is not new.
27) Did Grumman take any steps to control cost risk after the
award of the F-14 contract?
a) Reduced overhead by reducing employment from 31,500 in
1969 to 25,300 in 1971.
b) Reduced physical plant square footage by 630,000 square
feet.
(Both verified by NAVAIR audit team)
28) When Grumman accurately figured their losses during the first
two years of the F-14 contract, what legal alternative did they
have to get Government help to prevent bankruptcy?
a) They could have invoked the use of Public Law 85-804,
Extraordinary Contractor Relief. Use of this law would allow
Grumman to receive Governmental assistance to prevent
bankruptcy and assist them in keeping a good cash flow. If
the Contracting Officer and Congress approve invoking this
law, it would have allowed the Government to circumvent some
regulations to help the contractor from going out of business
with items like advanced payments.
b) Congress terms this a "Bail Out" of the contractor in
certain instances.
29) Captain Ames was replaced as the F-14 program manger by
Captain Leonard Snead. What reasons necessitated the removal of
Captain Ames?
a) Technical problems with TF-30 engines.
b) F-14 not performing to specification because of under
powered operations with the TF-30 engine.
c) Grumman appeared to be in trouble, losing money. Why
didn't the Navy see this coming?
30) Was replacing Captain Ames the "right thing to do."
a) This is a discussion question, there is no right answer.
b) Discuss points such as:
-P.M. is responsible for the procurement program.
-Victim of time and circumstance.
-Congress wanted penance for what they conceived as bad
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management of F-14 program due to problems that had
turned up during production.
31) Congressional fears of the F-14 were manifested by:
a) Reducing purchase numbers in 1972 from eighty-eight to
fourty-eight aircraft. Done by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense due to Congressional pressure.
b) Grumman initially refused to deliver any more aircraft
under the current contract. They did this because they had
lost $85 million dollars to date on the contract and to take
the 1972 order for fourty-eight aircraft would result in the
loss $105 million dollars by reducing their planned output by
fourty aircraft.
c) Congress would not allow the Navy to change the contract
in 1972. They were forcing the Navy to enforce the contract
as is, even though Grumman would suffer another loss.
d) Certain Congressional representatives considered the F-14
as little more than another "Gold Plated" aircraft that could
not do the job it was originally designed for.
32) Congressional support for the F-14 existed. Who were the
supporters?
a) Grumman was located in New York so the Congressmen and
Senators from New York were a natural source of support that
the Navy could depend on.
b) When Grumman accepted the loss of $105 million, they got
support for a contract change before the next production work
began.
c) Congressional support finally fell in favor of allowing
Grumman to renegotiate the F-14 contract at the five year
point in 1974 vice waiting for the originally contracted eight
year period.
d) Then changes that came about changed the unit cost of the
F-14 from $9.7 million to $17.9 million dollars each.
33) Class discussion on the advantages of prototypes, an extension
of the "Fly-before-you-buy" idea originated during the F-14
procurement by Under Secretary Packard.
a) List advantages and disadvantages of prototypes.
b) Advantages:
-Produce a proven aircraft,
-Expensive changes and back fit programs can be avoided
c) Disadvantages:
-Lengthens the Engineering and Manufacturing Phase of the
contract
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